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Abstract 
 
Basel III requires banks to build up extra buffer, known as the countercyclical capital 
buffer (CCB), during economic upturn when systemic risk tends to heighten. The 
buffer aims to reduce risk-taking during periods of high credit growth and to absorb 
potential losses in subsequent economic downturns. The Basel Committee 
recommends that the authorities should use the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio 
from its long-term trend as the primary indicator in setting the CCB. However, this 
research demonstrates that the Basel’s standard leading indicator, credit-to-GDP ratio, 
is suboptimal due to its negative correlation to gross domestic product (GDP) growth. 
This study proposes two new forward-looking indicators to guide the CCB with a 
macroprudential view: (1) the sovereign sector distance-to-default, and (2) the stock 
market illiquidity. Using a sample of 29 EU countries and US, according to Receiver 
operating characteristic curve framework, empirical results show that the two 
indicators better determine early warning signs in both build-up and release phases, 
and can better capture the build-up of systemic risk during early phases, in stark 
contrast to the credit-to-GDP ratio. This thesis contributes to the existing literature by 
providing distance-to-default of sovereign sector and stock market illiquidity as 
alternative indicators for the CCB build-up phase. More importantly, DD and ILO fill 
the gap of release phase leading indicators which has been largely left out by the 
Basel Committee. 
 
Keywords: countercyclical capital buffer; sovereign distance-to-default; market 
illiquidity; credit-to-GDP ratio 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
 
1.1 The Build up of Systemic Vulnerabilities Prior the Global Financial 
Crisis  
 
The 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) changed many people’s views about the 
world economy. Global per capita output, which typically expands by about 2.2% 
annually, experienced contraction of 1.8% in 2009 (Gorton, 2012). It was the largest 
contraction the global economy has experienced since World War II. In 2013, levels 
of economic activity were still below pre-crisis peaks in a number of high-income 
countries, including France, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom (UK). As a result of 
the unexpected GFC, crisis-hit countries struggled with worse fiscal positions than 
they had previously experienced, mostly because of the direct costs of bank bailouts. 
Along with the fiscal impact, there was huge monetary easing. By acting as lenders of 
last resort, central banks went far beyond standard operations by not only lowering 
their official intervention rates to the lowest levels in history, but also enormously 
expanding their balance sheets, with controversial long-term effects.  
 
An important lesson learnt from the GFC was the inadequacy of the microprudential 
financial regulation system. In the run-up to the GFC, regulatory approaches and 
prudential oversights failed to restrict excessive risk-taking by financial institutions. 
Firstly, a large portion of the financial system, known as the shadow banking system, 
which includes merchant banks, investment banks and off-balance-sheet vehicles of 
commercial banks, is operated outside the regulatory perimeter. Piror to the GFC, the 
shadow banking system was able to grow without much oversight, and eventually 
became a systemic risk. Secondly, the derivatives markets were largely unregulated 
and poorly overseen, which created the potential for chain reactions between financial 
markets and the real economy that led to systemic risk. Thirdly, the international 
activities of financial institutions were not monitored sufficiently. Markets, rating 
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agencies and regulators underestimated the conflicts of interest and informational 
asymmetry problems associated with the excessive risk-taking of originate-to-
distribute banking models. However, the focus of authorities remained primarily on 
the liquidity and solvency of individual institutions, rather than on the resilience of 
the financial system as a whole. This lapse led to an underestimation of the 
probability and costs of systemic risk. At the international level, insufficient 
coordination between regulators and supervisors, and the absence of clear procedures 
for the resolution of global financial institutions hindered efforts to prevent cross-
border transmission of the crisis.  
 
The underestimation of systemic risk before the GFC was largely influenced by the 
‘quiet period’ that occurred from 1934 to 2007, during which there were no systemic 
financial crises in the United States (US) (Gorton, 2012). This long absence of 
systemic banking crises caused banking regulators and economists to falsely believe 
that such events would never happen again. The International Monetary Fund’s 2006 
global financial stability report highlighted this belief with the announcement that, 
“there is growing recognition that the dispersion of credit risk by banks to a broader 
and more diverse set of investors, rather than warehousing such risk on their balance 
sheets, has helped make the banking and overall financial system more resilient”. 
Only one year after this proclamation the quiet period ended sharply with the onset of 
the GFC.  
 
The end of the quiet period and historically repeated financial crises strongly suggest 
that market economies have inherent features that can lead to financial crises. Gorton 
(2012) documents that “although each crisis has specific characteristics, financial 
crises have a common structural cause. It is the mismatch between short-term 
liabilities and long-term assets.” Banks create short-term liabilities so that individuals 
and firms have a way to transact. However, financial intermediaries cannot possibly 
honour these short-term debt obligations if they are withdrawn or not renewed. When 
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the whole financial system cannot honour its contractual demands, it becomes a 
systemic problem. 
1.2 Motivation for the Study 
 
In the aftermath of the GFC, both academics and policymakers realised that financial 
regulation policies needed to move in a macroprudential direction, in order to take 
systemic risk into account. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke (2008) 
summarised this new direction in his speech at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in 2008: 
 
Going forward, a critical question for regulators and supervisors is what their 
appropriate field of vision should be. Under our current system of safety-and-
soundness regulation, supervisors often focus on financial conditions of 
individual institutions in isolation. An alternative approach, which has been 
called system-wide or macroprudential oversight, would broaden the mandate 
of regulators and supervisors to encompass consideration of potential systemic 
risks and weaknesses as well. 
 
The design of the macroprudential regulation framework addresses systemic risk 
during the build-up phase and acts quickly during stress events to protect the banking 
system as a whole. The countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) of Basel III is one tool 
that fulfils the purpose of the macroprudential regulation framework. In practice, the 
buffer will build up during economic upturns to help restrict excessive risk-taking. 
When a crisis occurs, the buffer can be used to absorb losses so that banks do not 
have to reduce their lending ability.  
 
The main challenges for macroprudential authorities are taking all the possible 
sources of systemic risk into account, and then deciding when to activate and 
deactivate the CCB. As discussed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), it is easy to fall into 
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a ‘this time is different’ fallacy; for instance, belief that strong credit growth is 
associated with the convergence of a new equilibrium rather than an unsustainable 
increase in systemic risk. In response to these challenges, the Basel Committee 
promotes the credit-to-GDP (gross domestic product) ratio as the standard approach to 
guide CCB decisions (Bank for International Settlements, 2010). It is based on 
empirical evidence drawn from episodes of systemic banking crisis around the world 
(Drehmann et al., 2011). For instance, Borio and Lowe (2002, 2004) first documented 
that the credit-to-GDP gap is a very useful early warning indicator for banking crisis. 
More recently, Drehmann et al. (2010, 2011) have shown that the credit-to-GDP ratio 
gap has the most suitable signalling properties among a wide range of possible 
indicators: it tends to systematically increase as early as three to four years prior to a 
crisis, and the proportion of false signals is low.  
 
Despite the good historical performance of the credit-to-GDP ratio gap, it is unlikely 
to be used to set CCB on a stand-alone basis as it has two notable shortcomings. 
Firstly, a suitable build-up indicator should be transparent, so it is possible to 
understand why the risks increase. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
framework relies on the aggregate credit in the economy and, therefore, it is unable to 
indicate feedbacks and dynamics between different economy sectors. For instance, it 
cannot identify which segment of borrowers is behind a rapid growth of aggregate 
credit. Secondly, credit-to-GDP ratio is a backward-looking indicator. It relies on 
statistical analysis that was designed to signal the arrival of crises in the past. In other 
words, the framework evaluates whether there was an excessive aggregate credit 
growth from a historical perspective, and assumes that the observed correlations from 
the past will remain unchanged in the future. This shortcoming is obvious because the 
origins of crises change through time.  
 
Recent empirical studies also criticise the properties of the credit-to-GDP ratio, 
involving three main aspects: (i) it is not a good guideline for buffer settlement 
because it has the potential to aggravate the procyclical problem, which conflicts with 
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the CCB’s objective (Repullo and Saurina, 2011); (ii) it is not the best early warning 
indicator for banking crises, especially in the case of emerging market economies 
(Gersl and Seidler, 2012; Reserve Bank of South Africa, 2011); and (iii) it has 
measurement problems (Edge and Meisenzahl, 2011; Buncic and Melecky, 2013). As 
a macroprudential policy, the CCB is designed to mitigate systemic risk across the 
entire financial system. Although the credit-to-GDP ratio takes the aggregate credit 
into account, it misses the interactions, feedbacks and contagion effects between the 
economic sectors and international borders. 
 
Motivated by these limitations, this research proposes a sovereign contingent claim 
analysis framework and an endogenous market illiquidity option pricing framework to 
assess the CCB of Basel III. The two indicators proposed in this study are distance-to-
default of sovereign sector and stock market illiquidity. Unlike the credit-to-GDP 
ratio, distance-to-default and market illiquidity focus on the origin of systemic risk 
rather than only on the consequences. They are top-down approach indicators. More 
specifically, distance-to-default of sovereign sector measures the interaction and risk 
transfers between different economic sectors. It measures an important source of 
systemic risk, sovereign risk, which is not assessed by the credit-to-GDP ratio. The 
use of distance-to-default of sovereign sector as a CCB-guiding indicator considers 
systemic risks that originate from different sectors. Market illiquidity, on the other 
hand, measures the systemic liquidity condition of a given country. It is a proxy for 
conditions of the funding and asset market at a systemic level. More importantly, the 
frameworks provided by this research are able to assess a wide range of time-varying 
systemic risks including those that arise from both within and outside the banking 
system.  
 
1.3 The Research Questions  
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The frameworks proposed in this research take systemic risk of market-based 
financial systems into consideration and translate it into quantitative indicators. The 
sovereign contingent claim framework captures risk transmissions and interactions 
between economic sectors through a top-down approach. It is able to capture the 
build-up of systemic risk across the whole financial system, including the shadow 
banking system. The endogenous market illiquidity option pricing framework 
captures systemic market liquidity and thus measures the condition of the whole 
financial system.  
 
To test the performance of the two frameworks, this study uses the BIS standard 
indicator, that is, the credit-to-GDP ratio, as a benchmark to compare the 
performances of indicators generated from the sovereign contingent claim analysis 
and the endogenous market illiquidity option pricing framework respectively. As the 
CCB distinguishes between the indicators for the build-up and release phases, the 
performance of each indicator is documented and compared in separate phases.  
 
The research questions in Chapter 3 are as follows:  
Question 1: Is sovereign contingent claim analysis able to assess the countercyclical 
capital buffer in different phases? 
Question 2: Is distance-to-default of sovereign sector a better measure of systemic 
risk than the credit-to-GDP ratio?  
The research questions in Chapter 4 are as follows:  
Question 1: Is endogenous market illiquidity suitable for assessing the countercyclical 
capital buffer in different phases? 
Question 2: Is endogenous market illiquidity a better measure of systemic risk than 
the credit-to-GDP ratio? 
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1.4 Summary of Methodology  
 
This study offers a detailed vision of how to measure systemic risk in a 
macroprudential way and how to use these measurements as indicators to guide the 
build-up and release of the CCB. The two indicators proposed in this thesis are 
distance-to-default of sovereign sector and market illiquidity. Distance-to-default is 
driven by the sovereign contingent claim analysis framework, which examines the 
complex dynamics and feedbacks between economic sectors. Market illiquidity is 
generated from the endogenous market illiquidity option pricing framework. By 
calculating the maximum level of price for market illiquidity in a forward-looking 
way, the framework examines the contagious systemic liquidity risk that causes 
sudden collapse of the global financial system. 
 
The sovereign contingent claim analysis framework examines interactions and 
feedback effects through risk-adjusted balance sheets. These balance sheets link the 
financial sector with the sovereign sector and translate systemic risk into a forward-
looking indicator with a top-down macroprudential perspective, namely, the distance-
to-default. The sovereign contingent claim analysis framework measures the 
vulnerability of the financial system during the build-up phase and the non-linear 
effects during stress events and quantifies the effects of asset-liability mismatches 
within and across borders.  
 
The endogenous market illiquidity option pricing framework examines the 
interactions and feedbacks of funding and market liquidity. It measures the 
endogenous maximum level of market illiquidity without additional assumptions 
about information asymmetries (Longstaff, 1995). From a macroprudential 
perspective, liquidity risk is inherently systemic, because one financial institution’s 
liquidity strain may cause corresponding strain in another institution. The framework 
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captures the time-varying systemic liquidity changes within the domestic and global 
financial systems.  
 
1.5 Summary of Empirical Results 
 
There are four major results in this study. Firstly, the empirical results in Chapter 3 
indicate that during both build-up and release phases, the distance-to-default of 
sovereign sector performs better than the credit-to-GDP ratio. The distance-to-default 
of sovereign sector can provide a build-up signal at least three years ahead of a 
banking crisis and send release signals when systemic risk materialises. On the other 
hand, the credit-to-GDP ratio provides a higher noise-to-signal ratio compared with 
the distance-to-default across all critical thresholds. Moreover, the credit-to-GDP ratio 
cannot provide any meaningful results at any critical thresholds during the release 
phase. The lowest noise-to-signal ratio is 0.7 for the credit-to-GDP ratio gap and the 
highest noise-to-signal ratio is 0.14 for the distance-to-default of sovereign sector.  
 
Secondly, the receiver operating characteristic curve analysis in Chapter 4 shows that 
the market illiquidity outperforms the credit-to-GDP ratio during both phases of the 
CCB. For the build-up phase, the signalling ability of market liquidity is stable across 
different forecast horizons. For the release phase, in line with the distance-to-default, 
this study documents that stock market illiquidity is a reliable coincident indicator for 
guiding the CCB release phase. On the other hand, the credit-to-GDP ratio gap not 
only responds to financial crisis with a considerable lag, but continually sending 
build-up signal during the release phase. For instance, the credit-to-GDP ratio is not 
able to capture the build-up of systemic risk in Germany, which does not have 
domestic credit boom, but experienced the GFC because of the risk exposure to the 
global financial system; however, the distance-to-default and market illiquidity are 
able to capture the build-up of systemic risk for Germany from the global financial 
system.  
                                                                                               Faculty of Business and Law 
 
 | P a g e  
 
9 
Thirdly, results in Chapter 3 show that the distance-to-default of sovereign sector co-
moves positively with business cycles. By contrast, the credit-to-GDP is negatively 
correlated with the business cycle indicator, GDP growth. This implies that the use of 
credit-to-GDP ratio may worsen the procyclicality problem. Moreover, the average 
correlation between the distance-to-default and the credit-to-GDP ratio is close to zero. 
This result indicates different performance of the distance-to-default and the credit-to-
GDP ratio in guiding CCB decisions.  
 
Fourthly, results in Chapter 4 document that market illiquidity can provide a reliable 
release signal for policymakers with a large range of different risk aversion from type 
I errors (missing a banking crisis) and type II errors (receiving a false alarm). 
Conversely, the credit-to-GDP ratio is not able to provide reliable signals under any 
policymakers’ preference. More specifically, market illiquidity can provide high 
predicted rates with low false alarms for policymakers’ preferences ranging from 0.3 
to 0.7. However, the credit-to-GDP ratio provides high predicted rates only with high 
false alarms for all policymakers’ preferences.  
 
1.6 Contribution of the Research 
 
This thesis contributes to the literature in the following ways. Firstly, drawing from a 
large sample that includes most of the European Union members and the US, this is 
the first comprehensive study to propose new reliable indicators for guiding CCB 
build-up and release phase decisions. This study analyses two types of systemic risk 
that are not included in the credit-to-GDP ratio: (i) the interaction and feedback 
between sovereign risk and financial sector risk; and (ii) the interaction and feedback 
between funding liquidity and market liquidity. This is the first attempt to apply 
sovereign contingent claim analysis and the endogenous market liquidity option 
pricing framework to generate indicators with macroprudential view that can guide 
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the CCB. The two frameworks are important for macrofinancial risk management as 
they can measure systemic risk better than the credit-to-GDP ratio.  
 
Secondly, this study applies a signal extraction method and a receiver operating 
characteristic curve to assess the performances of different early warning indicators. 
The results show that the distance-to-default and market illiquidity perform better 
than the BIS standard indicator, the credit-to-GDP ratio, in both the build-up phase 
and release phase. In both phases, distance-to-default and market illiquidity generate 
lower type I errors and noise-to-signal ratios than the credit-to-GDP ratio, especially 
in the release phase. This study confirms that both the distance-to-default and market 
illiquidity have near-coincident properties suitable for the CCB release phase.  
 
Thirdly, this study confirms that the credit-to-GDP ratio has a negative correlation 
with GDP growth. This finding is consistent with the findings of Repullo and Saurina 
(2011) and implies that the use of the credit-to-GDP ratio may not only fail to fulfil 
the purpose of the CCB, but may also worsen the procyclical effect of the financial 
system. By contrast, the distance-to-default is empirically positively correlated with 
GDP growth. This implies that the distance-to-default is countercyclical in nature, 
which makes it suitable as a guiding indicator for the CCB.  
 
Fourthly, this study contributes to the practice of the CCB release phase for 
policymakers with different risk aversion. As the Basel III capital requirement 
operates at an international level, theoretically, the guiding indicator should be 
accepted by policymakers around the world with different risk aversion to type I and 
II errors. Results in Chapter 4 show that stock market illiquidity satisfies all critical 
criteria when policymakers’ risk aversion ranges from 0.3 to 0.7. Therefore, stock 
market illiquidity can contribute to the international operation of the CCB by serving 
as a standard CCB release phase indicator.  
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This thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 describes the literature review; Chapter 
3 frames the analyses of sovereign distance-to-default; Chapter 4 discusses the 
analyses of market illiquidity; and Chapter 5 summarises the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature review  
 
2.1 The Introduction of Countercyclical Capital Buffer of Basel III 
 
2.1.1 Procyclicality of the Financial System 
 
The instability of the market-based financial system refers to endogenous risks that 
are generated and amplified from shocks within the financial system (Danielsson and 
Shin, 2003). The idea that the financial market can feed on itself is not new. The idea 
is quite intuitive, and the theme is familiar among front-line market traders. For 
instance, when asset prices fall and traders get closer to their trading limits, they are 
forced to sell. This selling pressure sets off further downward pressure on asset prices, 
which induces a further round of selling. From a market-based financial point of view, 
such endogenous risks are known as procyclicality of the financial system. The term 
‘procyclicality’ refers to a more general endogenous reinforcing mechanism by which 
the financial system can amplify business fluctuations and possibly cause or 
exacerbate financial instability. The idea that financial factors can be a powerful 
amplifier of business cycles dates back to Fisher (1933). These feedback mechanisms 
are particularly disruptive and apparent during an economic downturn or when the 
financial system is facing strain. For instance, an institution’s ability to raise external 
funding worsens when the institution incurs losses and its capital declines. This, in 
turn, can induce banks to cut credit extensions and dispose of assets. This 
retrenchment of credit supply can thus weaken economic activity. 
 
Procyclicality could mislead the setting of capital buffer through measurement of 
systemic risks (Gordy and Howells, 2006; Repullo et al., 2010). For instance, the 
near-horizon estimates of short-term volatility, asset and default correlations, 
probabilities of default, and loss given default all move procyclically. As a result, 
systemic risk can be easily underestimated during economic upturn and overestimated 
during economic downturn. The Basel II bank capital requirements apply those 
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procyclical measurements of systemic risk as key indicating factors. Therefore, the 
Basel II capital requirements are inherently procyclical. For instance, under the 
internal ratings-based approach of Basel II, capital requirement is an increasing 
function of the probability of default and the loss given default. During bad times, 
these measures tend to increase, and as a result increase the capital requirement of 
banks, which may contribute to a severe contraction in the supply of credit (Repullo et 
al., 2010). In good times, these measurements tend to decrease, reducing the capital 
requirement of banks, which may contribute to credit and asset price bubbles. Such 
procyclical capital regulatory frameworks were documented prior to the GFC (e.g. 
Crockett, 2000; Borio et al., 2001; Borio, 2003).  
 
From a policy perspective, the inherently procyclical Basel II requirements are related 
to the concept of microprudential regulation. A microprudential capital requirement 
approach only focuses on the conditions of individual financial institutions and, thus, 
treats risks as exogenous. Asset prices, credit conditions and macroeconomy 
fundamentals are regarded as independent from the collective behaviour of financial 
firms. However, the mission of central banks and policymakers was to stabilise the 
economy as a whole through banking regulation policies. Instead of protecting the 
banking system during the crisis, the microprudential banking regulation policies 
made the problem even worse. The basic critique of microprudential regulation can be 
understood as follows. When a microprudentially oriented regulator pushes a troubled 
bank to restore its capital ratio, the regulator does not care whether the bank adjusts 
by raising new capital or by shrinking assets (Hanson et al., 2011). The bank’s 
probability of failure is brought back to a tolerable level through either method. Such 
indifference is reasonable if the regulators consider a single bank for idiosyncratic 
reasons. However, it does not consider the financial system as a whole. If a troubled 
bank chooses to shrink its assets by cutting back on lending, the other banks can 
follow the movement due to herd behaviour. If a large fraction of the financial system 
experiences difficulty, a simultaneous attempt by many institutions to shrink their 
assets is likely to dry up market liquidity in a very short period of time and can cause 
huge damage to the real economy.  
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Generalised asset shrinkage can affect the real economy through two primary costs: 
credit-crunch and fire-sale effects. As banks often shrink their assets by cutting new 
lending, companies find credit more expensive and will respond by reducing 
investment and employment. These actions cause the real economy to contract. In 
addition, if a large number of banks shrink their assets by dumping the same illiquid 
securities (e.g. mortgage-backed securities), the prices of these securities can drop 
sharply in a fire sale and market liquidity can quickly dry up (Shleifer and Vishny, 
2010). When the market is at equilibrium, the real costs of fire sales manifest 
themselves in the further deepening of credit crunches. For example, Ivashina and 
Scharfstein (2010) offer evidence about the extent of credit contraction during the 
GFC.  
To mitigate and repair the damaged regulation framework, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision published a Basel III banking capital regulation framework with 
a macroprudential viewpoint, which recognised the importance of general equilibrium 
effects and sought to safeguard the financial system as a whole. The macroprudential 
approach can be characterised as an effort to control the social costs associated with 
excessive balance sheet shrinkage on the part of multiple financial institutions hit with 
a common shock (Hanson et al., 2011). In practice, a CCB is included in Basel III. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision intends to use the CCB to limit the 
procyclicality of the financial system. The CCB ranges between 0 and 2.5 percentage, 
implemented on a country-by-country basis. The purpose of the buffer is “to achieve 
the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of 
excess credit growth that have often been associated with the build-up of systemic-
wide risk”. Therefore, the buffer should accumulate during periods of excessive credit 
expansion and be released at times of incipient financial stress. The build-up and 
release of the buffer can thus limit the amplitude of financial cycles. Specifically, 
during economic upturns, the build-up of the buffer limits lending and thus reduces 
the possibility of excessive credit growth. During economic downturns, the release of 
the buffer absorbs losses so banks should not have to reduce their lending ability.  
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2.1.2 Determining Countercyclical Capital Buffer  
 
In general, making a decision on CCB includes four stages:  
(1) monitoring a set of indicators that reflect the build-up of systemic risk; 
(2) making a decision on the activation of the buffer and its size when indicators 
send out build-up signals; 
(3) monitoring the set of indicators that reflect stress in the banking sector; and 
(4) making a decision to release the buffer when indicators send out release 
signals. 
 
Stages 1 and 2 are related to the optimal build-up of the CCB. Stages 3 and 4 are 
related to the optimal release of the buffer. Both build-up and release decisions are 
conceptually simple. When systemic risk is building up, the buffer should be activated 
(or increased further if it is already activated); when systemic risk has materialised, 
the buffer should be decreased or released entirely. However, in practice, neither 
build-up nor release decisions are simple. Both decisions rely on suitable indicators 
that are able to reflect time-varying systemic risk.  
 
2.1.3 Candidate Indicators for Countercyclical Capital Buffer  
 
The existing indicators for financial instability can be categorised into three groups. 
The simplest type of indicators for signalling financial instability is based on 
aggregate macroeconomic information and bank balance sheets, for instance, GDP 
growth, credit growth, deviations of real equity prices, real property prices, non-
performing loans and loan loss provisions. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show that 
growth rates in money, credit and several other variables that exceed certain 
thresholds are more likely to cause a banking crisis. In a comprehensive review, 
Goldstein et al. (2000) report that a wide range of monthly indicators helps to predict 
banking crises, including appreciation of the real exchange rate, a decline in equity 
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prices, a rise in the money multiplier, a decline in real output, a decline in exports and 
a rise in the real interest rate. Although these indicators are widely available, they are 
backward-looking rather than forward-looking indicators. Given the fact that the 
countercyclical capital buffer needs to build up before financial stress, these 
indicators are hard to fulfil such a purpose. In addition, Borio et al. (2001) provide 
empirical evidences to show that most of these indicators are negatively correlated 
with business cycles. It means that these indicators are likely to miss leading the 
countercyclical capital buffer rather than guide it to the right direction.  
 
The second type of indicators is credit ratings for individual financial institutions. 
Compare to the first type of indicators, most of rating-related indicators are forward-
looking in nature as they are derived from Merton’s model. However, they are bank 
specific (bottom-up) and microprudential indicators that only calculate the 
idiosyncratic risks. It requires a buttom-up aggregate measure to apply to 
macroprudential instruments like countercyclical capital buffer. However, bottom-up 
aggregate indicators do not take feedbacks, dynamics and correlations between 
economic sectors into account. As a result, they are not suitable for countercyclical 
capital buffer whose purpose is to safeguard the financial system as a whole (Borio 
and Drehmann, 2009).  
 
The last group of indicators is market-based indicators. These indicators are not only 
forward-looking measures of risk but also point-in-time measures of risk. These 
indicators are more efficient than indicators like the debt-to-GDP ratio in predicting 
turning points of business cycles. Illing and Liu (2006) developed an index of 
financial stress, which is a weighted sum of market-based indicators for the banking 
sector, debt markets, equity markets and liquidity measure. The indictor demonstrates 
good signalling ability when applied to the US and the euro zone However, 
Drehmann et al. (2010, 2011) show that pure market indicators like banking sector 
credit spreads generate many false signals and a rather short forecast horizon, 
although they are useful for CCB decision-making.  
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To overcome the limitations of the aforementioned indicators, the Basel Committee 
proposed the use of early warning indicators. As an early warning indicator, the 
credit-to-GDP ratio performs best in the build-up phase of CCB with respect to long-
term trends (Drehmann et al., 2010, 2011; Drehmann and Juselius, 2014; Drehmann, 
2013). The credit-to-GDP ratio also demonstrates good signalling ability across 
countries. It can give banks enough time to build up capital before crises occur. 
However, the credit-to-GDP ratio is not a reliable indicator in the buffer release phase, 
as it cannot accurately identify the non-linear risk dynamics of the economy during 
bad times. To make the credit-to-GDP ratio gap operational, the BIS framework 
follows a mechanical rule to determine the size of countercyclical buffers based on 
the size of the credit-to-GDP ratio gap: when the gap reaches 2% the CCB is activated; 
when the gap is between 2% and 10% the CCB is a linear function of the credit gap; 
and when the gap is higher than 10% the CCB is set to the maximum level of 2.5%.  
 
2.1.4 Shortcomings of Credit-to-GDP Ratio 
 
In order to guide the macroprudential Basel III CCB, ideal indicators need to have 
three features. Firstly, they need to derive from a top-down approach to reflect the 
macroprudential view of financial stability regulation. Secondly, they need to be 
forward-looking in nature, as the build-up of systemic risk often occurs before a crisis. 
Thus, this feature is important to the build-up of the CCB. Thirdly, they need to 
capture the dynamics and feedback effects of the financial system because these 
effects are important during stress periods. Although the credit-to-GDP ratio has 
proven to be a useful indicator for the CCB build-up phase, the total credit used to 
generate the credit-to-GDP ratio is the sum of an individual financial institution’s 
credit supply at a given point of time. Therefore, the credit-to-GDP ratio is more a 
bottom-up than top-down approach. The interconnection effects between institutions 
and economy sectors are missing from the credit-to-GDP ratio. Therefore, the credit-
to-GDP ratio falls short of the first and third features of an ideal CCB indicator. 
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Empirical studies by Drehmann et al. (2010, 2011) show that the credit-to-GDP ratio 
is not a reliable indicator for the CCB release phase.  
 
Repullo and Saurina (2011) question the use of the credit-to-GDP ratio as a 
preference indicator for the CCB. They show that the credit-to-GDP ratio gap is 
negatively correlated with GDP growth for many countries. This implies that the use 
of the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio is likely to worsen the financial system 
procyclicality problem by decreasing the CCB in good times while increasing the 
buffer in bad times. Therefore, use of the credit-to-GDP ratio gap may exacerbate 
rather than mitigate the inherent procyclicality of the financial system.  
 
Another important source of systemic risk that is not detected  by the credit-to-GDP 
ratio is the international spill-over effect. Recent studies show that global factors can 
play important roles in driving financial crisis. A variety of global factors have been 
reported to trigger financial crises, including deterioration in the terms of trade and 
shocks to world interest rates and commodity prices. For example, a sharp rise in US 
interest rates was identified as a trigger for the Latin American sovereign debt crisis 
of the 1980s. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) argue that the global imbalances of the 
2000s and the 2007–09 GFC are intimately connected. International trade and other 
real linkages can be the channels of transmission, and contagion in financial markets 
is associated with crises (Forbes, 2012). As the credit-to-GDP gap is implicitly based 
on the assumption that a specific country’s banks are only exposed to the financial 
cycles of that country, it is difficult to capture cross-border exposures.  
 
Alfaro and Drehmann (2009) document that a large fraction of historical banking 
crises were not preceded by weak domestic macroeconomic conditions. In addition, 
the International Monetary Fund (2013) reports that nations like New Zealand and 
South Korea have low national saving and their banks have relied on external debts to 
fund private sector credit. For instance, New Zealand’s gross external debt exceeded 
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130% of GDP in 2009. This implies that New Zealand’s banking system distress can 
be triggered by their international counterparties’ financial distress. A study by Chen 
and Christensen (2010) also highlights this cross-border spill-over effect. Peek and 
Rosengren (2000) show how the drop in Japanese stock prices in 1990, combined 
with binding capital requirements, led to Japanese bank branches in the US reducing 
their credit lending, which consequently caused US financial system instability. 
Popov and Udell (2012) provide evidence that less capitalised Western European 
banks reduced the credit supply of their Eastern European subsidiaries during the 
early stages of the GFC. This evidence points to obvious cross-border systemic risks; 
however, the credit-to-GDP ratio gap is not able to capture these risks.  
 
The issue of cross-border exposures is an important part of the ‘global liquidity’ effect 
that has recently attracted the attention of researchers and policymakers. The global 
liquidity effect is closely related to the changing roles of international financial 
intermediaries in the global financial system. The changing roles of banks were 
highlighted by the GFC (Brunnermeier, 2009; Adrian and Shin, 2010). In traditional 
banking models, banks issue loans and hold them until they are repaid, and assets are 
valued at historical costs. However, the traditional model has been replaced by the 
new ‘originate and distribute’ banking system in which loans are pooled, tranched and 
then resold via securitisation (Brunnermeier, 2009). Securitisation both enhances and 
relies on liquidity. Banks are not only the providers but also become users of market 
liquidity. Obviously many market participants including market brokers and hedge 
funds depend on liquidity facilities provided by banks. However, banks themselves, 
especially investment banks, rely permanently on the issuance of securities for 
funding their financing needs. As a result, the securitisation model of the US banking 
system led to an expansion of cheap credits and lending standards fell.  
 
The sovereign sector distance-to-default and stock market illiquidity approaches 
proposed in this study include all three features of CCB indicators. The main 
advantages of these indicators are that they are not only top-down approach and 
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forward-looking in nature, but also structure-based. They are able to capture the 
interconnections and feedback effects within financial markets and between economic 
sectors. In addition, the market illiquidity indicator is not only able to measure 
domestic systemic risk, but also takes international contagion effects into account. 
The results provided in chapters 3 and 4 show that they are reliable indicators for both 
build-up and release phases of the CCB.  
 
2.2 Sovereign Contingent Claim Analysis Framework 
 
The macrofinancial framework proposed by Gray et al. (2006) is able to provide a 
top-down approach to assess systemic risk in the financial system. The framework 
identifies balance sheet mismatches between the sovereign sector and other economy 
sectors, incorporates uncertainty inherent in risk-adjusted balance sheet components, 
captures systemic risk transmissions between sectors and translates systemic risks into 
quantifiable forward-looking indicators. It combines the macroeconomy information, 
financial market information and non-linear risk exposures together. The approach 
has been widely applied in the analysis of corporate sector credit risk and it is 
increasingly being used to estimate risk in the financial sector. When macrofinancial 
models were applied to sovereign risk, the risk indictors explained 80% of real 
sovereign credit default spreads (Gapen et al., 2005, 2008). 
 
Empirically, there are few studies documenting the interactions between the sovereign 
and banking sectors. For instance, Ejsing and Lemke (2009) find that in GFC the 
rescue packages announced by several euro zone governments for their banking 
sectors lowered the risk spreads of financial institutions, however, the spread of 
sovereign risk had increased since investors perceived that credit risk had been 
transferred from the banking sector to the sovereign sector. Moreover, Mody (2009) 
documented similar evidence by highlighting the consequences of the rescue for Bear 
Stearns in March 2008. Both study shed light on the linkage between banking sector 
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and sovereign sector where the financial sector’s vulnerabilities could play an 
increasingly central role in sudden increases of sovereign spreads. Since the 
instability of all economic sectors could be transferred into sovereign sector, the 
measuring of sovereign sector risk could be a proxy for measuring systemic risk.  
 
More recently, systemic risk has been measured by determining the contribution of 
individual financial institutions to systemic risk in a way that captures possible 
contagion between institutions. Examples include ‘The value at risk of the financial 
system conditional on institutions being under distress - CoVaR’ (Adrian and 
Brunnermeier, 2011) and ‘systemic expected shortfall’ (Acharya et al., 2009). These 
measures attempt to mitigate the shortcomings of rating-related indicators; however, 
they are still bottom-up approaches. Although these indicators rely on a market price 
of risk and have forward-looking properties, they are different from macrofinancial 
related indicators in that they require additional measures or assumption of correlation 
between institutions. 
 
The CoVaR proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) measures how financial 
difficulties of one institution can increase the tail risk of others and the whole 
financial system. According to Adrian and Brunnermeier’s definition, the CoVaR for 
a certain institution is defined as the value at risk (VaR) of the whole financial sector 
on the condition that the institution is in distress. A bank’s marginal contribution to 
systemic risk is then computed as the difference between its CoVaR and the financial 
system’s unconditional VaR. The model’s early warning property relies on regression 
analysis that can predict future CoVaRs on a quarterly basis. However, there are 
methodological shortcomings in the estimation of the VaR of the financial system as 
the bank’s VaR has procyclicality effects. Given that the procyclicality effect is the 
type of systemic risk that the CCB is trying to mitigate, the CoVaR which relies on 
individual bank’s VaR may not be an ideal indicator for guiding the CCB.  
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Acharya et al. (2009) calculate the systemic expected shortfall, which is related to the 
‘marginal expected shortfall’, a concept that specifies historical expected losses, 
conditional on having breached a pre-set high systemic risk threshold. The early 
warning property of this method relies on adjusting the marginal expected shortfall by 
the degree of firm-specific leverage and capitalisation yields. However, the marginal 
expected shortfall only measures the average, linear and bivariate dependence of the 
systemic risk. Therefore, it is unlike to capture the sudden increase of systemic risk 
during stress periods.  
 
2.3 The Importance of Market Illiquidity to Financial Stability 
 
In a market-based financial system, the balance sheets of financial institutions are 
mark-to-market. The changes in asset prices are recorded immediately on financial 
institutions’ balance sheets and have an instant impact on the net worth of all 
constituents of the financial system. In the context of mark-to-market balance sheets, 
financial institutions adjust their balance sheets actively through changing their 
leverage level in order to respond to changes in prices and measured risk (Adrian and 
Shin, 2010). The leverage of financial institutions is high during booms and low 
during busts, rendering leverage procyclical.  
 
The procyclical leverage of financial institutions plays a key role in financial booms 
and crises. In the boom phase, the asset price that is held widely by market players 
and financial intermediaries is increased. The increase in general price boosts the 
equity and net worth of these institutions and therefore strengthens their overall 
balance sheets. When balance sheets become stronger, leverage falls, and because 
institutions have procyclical leverage, they must respond to the decrease by topping 
up leverage. One way to increase leverage is to borrow more and buy more of the 
assets they already hold. It is easy for financial institutions to borrow when the 
economy is good and their balance sheets are strong; however, increased demand 
tends to drive up asset prices. Market liquidity, which can be described as the ease of 
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finding somebody to take on the other side of the trade and transfer of the asset with 
its entire cash flow, is also high during the boom phase. Then there is the potential for 
a feedback effect: stronger balance sheets lead to greater demand for the asset, and 
this, in turn, raises the asset’s price and further strengthens the balance sheets (Adrian 
and Shin, 2010). This self-reinforcing process adds to market-making capacity and 
hence increases liquidity in the markets. Concomitantly, the measures of market 
volatility may appear comparatively low (Borio, 2004).  
 
During economic downturns, the mechanism works in reverse. The trigger of a 
downturn can be either exogenous or endogenous. Either way, asset prices will fall. 
When asset prices decline, the net worth of institutions falls. As the institutions’ 
balance sheets weaken, their leverage will increase. As the leverage of these financial 
institutions is procyclical they must attempt to reduce leverage. One way to decrease 
leverage is to sell assets, then use the money to pay down debt. Thus, a fall in the 
price of the asset can lead to an increase in the supply of the asset, overturning the 
normal supply response to a drop in asset price, and increasing volatility so liquidity 
evaporates (Borio, 2004; Adrian and Shin, 2010). It is difficult to find someone who 
will take on the other side of the trade, which then leads to lower market liquidity. 
When market is illiquid, it is difficult to raise money by selling assets and these sales 
depress the asset price further, inducing more selling at a decreased leverage. More 
importantly, low market liquidity will eventually weaken the balance sheets of 
financial institutions and make it hard for them to borrow from domestic and 
international funding markets. Thereafter, the market illiquidity and funding liquidity 
shortage reinforce each other: falling asset prices and procyclical leverage of financial 
institutions increase the margin requirement of traders, which then causes asset fire 
sales and market illiquidity that depress the asset price further. The further an asset 
price falls, the weaker the financial institutions’ balance sheets, which leads to more 
asset sales and reduced leverage.  
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Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) developed a model that addresses the interaction 
between funding liquidity and market liquidity. Their model suggests that a 
destabilising margin can force speculators to delever their positions in times of crisis 
and lead to procyclical market liquidity provision. Markets are dependent on back-up 
liquidity lines from financial institutions, and institutions are dependent on continuous 
market liquidity to execute their risk management strategies.  
 
Procyclical leverage can also amplify the contagion effect of financial institutions 
through international financial markets. As market liquidity affects all participants, it 
can act as a powerful contagion channel. Its fluctuations trigger discrete moves in 
asset prices and finally results in feedback and reinforces the loop between market 
and funding liquidity, which can increase or decrease their ability to provide liquidity 
to the market. Before the GFC, external credit outpaced overall credit in small 
European countries including Ireland, Hungry, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Borio et 
al., 2011). In addition, global banks played a significant role in the transmission of the 
2007–09 GFC to emerging market economies through liquidity shock (Cetorelli and 
Goldberg, 2011). Furthermore, after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in 
September 2008, cross-border bank lending contracted sharply (De Haas and Van 
Horen, 2012). Indeed, capital account liberalisations have been accompanied by 
higher correlations of global stock markets over the past century (Quinn and Voth, 
2008). 
 
Stock market liquidity contains important leading indicators for the real economy, and 
has since at least World War II (Næs et al., 2011). In addition, stock market illiquidity 
can be linked with bond market illiquidity. Goyenko and Ukhov (2009) argue that the 
effect of stock illiquidity on bond illiquidity is consistent with flight-to-quality or 
flight-to-liquidity episodes. Deterioration of stock market liquidity conditions can 
result in reduced liquidity and value of financial institutions’ collateral and increased 
demand for high-quality collateral during economic downturns. Moreover, bond 
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illiquidity acts as a channel through which monetary policy shocks are transferred into 
the stock market.  
 
The examples above shed light on stock market illiquidity as a potential indicator for 
monitoring international financial system stability. During economic booms, stock 
market liquidity increases because financial intermediaries are targeting higher 
leverage and generating more credit. During economic downturns, stock market 
liquidity is likely to evaporate due to the deleverage behaviour of financial institutions. 
More importantly, domestic stock market liquidity can reflect global liquidity effects 
due to the spill-over effect of the stock market.  
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Chapter 3 – A Sovereign Contingent Claim Analysis to 
Assess Countercyclical Capital Buffer of Basel III 
 
3.1 The Importance of Sovereign Risk to Financial Stability  
 
The recent GFC, which developed from a global banking crisis in the summer of 2007 
into a European sovereign debt crisis in 2010, has been one of the most challenging 
episodes for policymakers both at governments and central banks since the 
introduction of the euro in 1999. The GFC and the ensuing recession have caused a 
sharp deterioration in sovereign sectors across advanced economies. Understanding 
the interconnections and feedback effects between the sovereign and financial sectors 
of a financial system becomes an important task in uncovering destabilising features. 
Moreover, the devastating consequences of the GFC call for a more comprehensive 
macroprudential approach that takes into account the dynamic interactions between 
the financial and sovereign sectors to address the stability of the financial system as a 
whole. This chapter proposes the use of a sovereign contingent claims approach to 
assess the systemic risk that arises from the interaction between these two sectors, and 
then uses the results to search for an appropriate early warning indicator for the Basel 
III countercyclical capital buffer (CCB).  
 
As the crisis deepened at the end of 2008, many countries took unprecedented 
interventions to support their financial systems, including unconventional monetary 
easing, enhanced deposit insurance, debt and asset guarantees, capital injections into 
banks and distressed asset management programs. Although these interventions have 
helped to stabilise the financial system, they also transferred large complex risk 
exposures from the banking sector to the sovereign sector. This risk transfer can 
generate severe consequences not only to the sovereign sector but also to the whole 
financial system. In Europe, investors’ concerns about sovereign sector conditions of 
Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy and Portugal spread easily through financial markets, 
causing investors to withdraw from the funding market, which ultimately affected the 
                                                                                               Faculty of Business and Law 
 
 | P a g e  
 
27
function of the market-based financial system.  
 
An unstable public sector will affect the banking sector directly. For instance, in 
advanced countries, banks’ market valuation is negatively related to government debt 
and deficits (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). In addition, Borensztein and 
Panizza (2009) estimate a high probability of having a banking crisis conditional on a 
sovereign default. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) point out a more important interaction 
between the banking and sovereign sectors – banking crises are often followed by a 
large increase in public debt to GDP ratio. The increase in the ratio is not only a 
consequence of bailout costs but also a result of the sharp slowdown in GDP growth. 
Further, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) report that between the end of 2007 and the end 
of 2010, average budget deficits in advanced countries increased from 1% to 8% of 
GDP and gross government debt rose from 73% to 97% of GDP. Moreover, 
government debt levels in advanced economies are expected to rise over coming years 
due to high fiscal deficits, raising pension and health care costs. A report from the 
Committee on the Global Financial System (2011) shows that risk premia on 
government debt will likely be higher and more volatile than in the past. These effects 
shows that understanding the dynamics between the sovereign sector and banking 
sector is critical for understanding the systematic risk faced by the financial system as 
a whole. However, the important feedback mechanisms between the two sectors have 
not been closely studied, as previous research has tended to independently study 
sovereign and banking sector risks. 
 
A weak sovereign sector can negatively affect the banking sector and trigger a 
systemic banking crisis. Because the sovereign sector is usually financed through the 
banking sector, a large number of government debts are held by the banking system. 
Government bonds are usually treated as high quality assets. Practically, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision allows banks to treat government debts as risk-
free assets and therefore they can fund such debts with zero capital. In a market-based 
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financial system, banks can use government debts as high quality collateral to borrow 
from the money and capital markets. However, the GFC demonstrated that 
government debts are far from risk-free. When government debts lose their value, it is 
difficult for banks to raise sufficient funds for their operation, and they may be forced 
to sell their assets. If many banks act in the same way, this collective behaviour could 
lead to funding shortages and liquidity problems in a very short time. Consequently, a 
systemic banking crisis may occur if there are not enough funds for financial 
institutions to roll over their short-term liabilities. If there is a banking crisis, 
government guarantees to rescue the banking sector can make the condition of the 
sovereign sector even worse than in the pre-crisis period. In turn, the value of 
government debts will further reduce and the feedback effects continue.  
 
A weak banking sector can trigger feedback effects between the sovereign sector and 
the banking sector through two main channels: (i) draining public resources through 
bank bailouts; and (ii) reducing economic growth and amplifying rather than 
absorbing shocks to the economy. The first channel is due to the sovereign sector’s 
desire to preserve financial stability. It is endogenous as long as an official regulatory 
system exists. Saving the banking system can place an enormous financial burden on 
the sovereign sector, which increases the risk of government debts. In turn, banks can 
borrow less through funding markets using risky government bonds as collateral. The 
second channel is due to the central role of the banking system in the overall 
economy. Well-functioning financial institutions contribute to economic growth by 
reducing transaction costs, selecting profitable investment opportunities, mobilising 
saving and diversifying risks. If banks are weak, this process can be interrupted, and 
financial market expectations of economy growth may decline. Changing 
expectations of economic growth can lead to an increase in the risk of government 
bonds, which reduces the value of government bonds and eventually drives up 
wholesale funding costs. In turn, this further weakens the banking sector and the 
feedback effects continue. The experiences from the European sovereign debt crisis 
are vivid examples of the feedback effects described above. Higher sovereign risk has 
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pushed up the cost and adversely affected the banks’ funding condition. For instance, 
banks in Greece, Ireland and Portugal have found it difficult to raise wholesale debts 
and deposits and have become reliant on the European central bank’s liquidity.  
 
The sovereign contingent claim analysis framework proposed in this chapter builds on 
the literature of the interactions between the sovereign sector and the banking sector. 
The approach is closely related to the macrofinancial framework proposed by Gray et 
al. (2006), which examines the interconnections, feedbacks and dynamics between 
economic sectors. In line with the macrofinancial framework, the sovereign 
contingent claim analysis framework is a top-down approach that examines the 
stability of the financial system as a whole. It combines frequently updated market 
information with sovereign sector balance sheets data rather than merely relying on 
macroeconomy data or pure market-based data. It differs from backward-looking 
macroeconomic vulnerability models and accounting-based models, which only use 
historical data and so can not comprehensively address uncertainty in a forward-
looking perspective.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: sections 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 present 
methodology and data; section 3.5 describes the empirical results; section 3.6 reports 
robustness tests results; and section 3.7 concludes the chapter.  
 
3.2 Method to Assess Systemic Risk Exposure 
 
In line with the macrofinancial risk framework, the sovereign contingent claims 
approach is designed to assess a country’s exposure to systemic risk using Merton’s 
(1974) contingent capital analysis. The underlying approach is to interlink three 
aggregate sectors of an economy: (i) the corporate and household sector, (ii) the 
financial sector and (iii) the public sector (Figure 1). In particular, the transmission of 
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risk originated from a change in asset value in one sector is estimated by a change in 
the values of liabilities and equity in another sector as put and call options 
respectively. Therefore, through the interconnectedness of balance sheets across 
different sectors, the default risk of a sector can be assessed by measuring the distance 
between its implied market value of assets and distress barrier in another sector.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The inter-relationship of balance sheets among the corporate and household 
sector, the financial sector and the public sector. 
 
During good times, the financial sector can provide excessive credit to the public 
sector by buying government debts. Financial institutions can use government bonds 
as risk-free collateral to borrow from the money and capital markets, then provide 
excessive credit to the corporate and household sector and cause expansion to the 
balance sheets of both. As liabilities of the corporate and household sector are claims 
of assets in the financial sector (e.g. loans), during bad times a shock to the former 
reduces the value of the latter. Furthermore, a decline in asset value in the financial 
sector as a result of financial distress from the corporate and household sector can 
lead to an increase in systemic risk where banks are more likely to experience bank 
runs and widespread credit defaults. In a market-based financial system, a falling 
asset price means financial institutions can borrow less from the funding market by 
using them as collateral. With limited funds available, the financial sector is forced to 
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reduce credit supply to other sectors, which in turn causes asset prices to decline even 
further. This increase in systemic risk is then linked to an increase in the contingent 
liabilities of the public sector due to a government’s implicit or explicit guarantee on 
the financial sector (e.g. bank bailouts due to too-big-to-fail policy). When the value 
of the contingent liabilities increases, the asset value of the public sector decreases. It 
follows that sovereign risk is likely to increase when systemic risk is building up in 
the financial sector.  
 
As a result, a decline in the value of firm and household debts may set off a chain 
reaction on the asset side of the financial sector that culminates in a decrease in 
government assets. In an extreme case, it is possible that a government may not be 
able to meet its contingent debt obligation due to its deteriorating financial position. 
The debt of Greece’s government is a vivid example of large bank failures placing the 
entire financial system under stress. In addition, the recent euro sovereign debt and 
banking crisis shows that the path of risk transmission can also include a feedback 
effect from the public sector to the banking sector that in turn affects the corporate 
and household sector in the form of reduced lending and credit tightening. A low 
expectation of future economic growth can decrease the strength of the sovereign 
sector by decreasing the value of government debt. As a result, the banks that hold the 
government debt may experience a decrease on their asset side of the balance sheet. 
Furthermore, the banks that use government bonds as collateral to raise short-term 
funds will find it challenging to roll them over. This will likely cause bank to reduce 
credit supply to the corporate and household sector (Hanson et al., 2011). As a result, 
economic activity will decrease further and lead to a more vulnerable sovereign 
sector. Conversely, when credit conditions are favourable as the corporate and 
household sector performs well, the value of assets in the financial sector increases 
and in turn reduces liabilities in the public sector. Therefore, variations in credit 
conditions across financial cycles are related to changes in government balance 
sheets, and sovereign risk is closely related to systemic risk in a market-based 
financial system. 
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Based on the sovereign contingent claims approach framework, we use distance-to-
default of sovereign sector to capture the sovereign risk in government balance sheets 
as an alternative measure for evaluating credit conditions of the financial sector. 
Under the CCB schemes, the sovereign sector distance-to-default can be used as an 
alternative indicator to trigger the build-up and release phases of capital buffers. In 
contrast to the credit-to-GDP ratio recommended by Basel III, estimates of sovereign 
sector distance-to-default from the contingent capital analysis of Merton (1974) may 
be a more effective triggering indicator, as it tends to be more forward-looking.  
 
The assets of the sovereign balance sheet include international reserves and domestic 
currency assets, while the liabilities include foreign currency debt and domestic 
currency debt. More importantly, all the items of liability are directly observable from 
market prices. The implied values and volatilities of sovereign assets can be 
estimated. In order to estimate implied sovereign assets and volatility of sovereign 
assets from the liability side of the risk-adjusted balance sheet, an additional 
assumption on the seniority of sovereign liabilities is necessary. Following the 
building blocks set by Gray et al. (2006) and Gapen et al. (2005, 2008), foreign 
currency debt can be modelled as a senior claim and domestic currency debt as junior 
claims. Under this assumption, sovereign stress occurs when the implied assets are 
struggling to meet foreign currency debt. By contrast, the domestic currency debt is a 
residual value of sovereign assets after the payments to foreign currency debt. 
Therefore, the value of domestic currency debt can be modelled as an implicit call 
option on sovereign assets.  
 
It is reasonable to consider domestic currency debt as ‘equity-like’ claims as 
governments and central banks have the flexibility to issue money. The ability to issue 
can increase sovereign assets and in most cases can exchange foreign currency. 
Therefore, the value of domestic currency debt can be inflated via the issuing of 
money. Domestic currency debt and money are then similar to shares issued by 
companies. Moreover, an economy’s sovereign condition is often reflected in the 
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exchange rate of its currency. This equity-like property is clearly revealed when 
converting domestic currency liabilities into US dollars. Exchange rate can be view as 
the ‘share price’ of domestic currency liability, just like the value of a company is 
dependent on the number of shares and the market price of its equity. 
 
Because the value of domestic currency liabilities can be modelled as an implicit call 
option on sovereign assets, a standard Merton model1 can be used to generate the 
implied value of sovereign assets and its volatility. This technique relies on several 
inputs including the value and volatility of domestic currency liabilities, the distress 
barrier, the risk-free interest rate and time. The value of domestic currency debt is 
observable through publicly available databases. The volatility of domestic currency 
debt is used as a proxy for volatility of exchange rates. The distress barrier2 of a given 
sovereign is assumed to be equal to the total book value of its foreign currency debt. 
The time horizon for the estimation is one year. The risk-free rate is equal to a one-
year US treasury bill rate. 
 
஽ܸ஼௅ ൌ ஺ܸܰሺ݀ଵሻ െ ܦܤି௥೑௧ܰሺ݀ଶሻǡ                                         (Eqn 1) 
 
݀ଵ ൌ
 ቀ ஺ܸܦܤቁ ൅ ቀݎ௙ ൅
ͳ
ʹߪ஺
ଶቁ ݐ
ߪ஺ξݐ
 
 
݀ଶ ൌ ݀ଵ െ ߪ஺ξݐ                                                          (Eqn 2) 
                                                             
1Merton’s model is initially applied for valuation of corporates. See Merton (1973, 1974, 1977, 1992, 
and 1998). 
2There are different definitions for distress barrier. KMV (1999, 2001) set distress barrier between the 
book value of short-term debt and total debt for corporate. This study has a different focus, on the 
measure of systemic risk barometers. 
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஽ܸ஼௅ ൌ
ఙಲ
ఙವ಴ಽ ஺ܸ
ܰሺ݀ଵሻ                                                    (Eqn 3) 
 
where ஽ܸ஼௅ is the value of domestic currency debt, ஺ܸ is the value of sovereign assets, 
DB is the distress barrier, ݎ௙ is the risk-free interest rate and t is the time to maturity. 
N(.) is the cumulative probability distribution function for a standard normal variable, 
ߪ஺ is the standard deviation of return on sovereign assets and ߪ஽஼௅  is the standard 
deviation of domestic currency liabilities. Eqn 1 and Eqn 3 derive the two unknowns: 
implied sovereign assets and implied sovereign assets volatility.  
 
The derived implied asset value and volatility can be used to develop useful indicators 
of sovereign risk. If the implied sovereign asset is above the distress barrier, it implies 
that the service of debt can be met, otherwise it would lead to financial stress. The 
distance-to-default is an indicator that measures the differences between the implied 
market future value of sovereign assets and the distress barrier. A bigger distance-to-
default indicates that a given economy is experiencing good times and systemic risk is 
likely to build up. By contrast, a smaller distance-to-default reflects that a given 
economy is experiencing bad times and the probability of crisis is high. This ability of 
distance-to-default to identify good times and bad times is important for reliable 
decisions on CCB. The distance-to-default is ݀ଶ in Eqn 2, which can be written as: 
 
݀ଶ ൌ
୪୬ቀ௏ಲ ୣ୶୮൬ቀ௥೑ି
భ
మఙಲ
మቁ௧൰ቁି୪୬ሺ஽஻ሻ
ఙಲξ௧
                                          (Eqn 4) 
 
3.3 Method for Signal Evaluation 
 
To assess the performance of each indicator in the build-up and release phases of the 
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CCB, we follow the signal extraction method used originally by Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) and recently by a series of Bank for International Settlements studies 
(Borio and Lowe, 2002; Drehmann et al., 2010, 2011; Drehmann, 2013).  
 
For the build-up phase, as both distance-to-default and credit-to-GDP ratio tend to be 
high during good times, for each period and country, the signal takes a value of 1 (on) 
if the indicator exceeds a critical threshold3; it takes 0 (off) otherwise. A signal of 1 is 
judged to be correct if a crisis occurs at any time within the next three years, and a 
signal of 0 is judged to be correct if no crisis occurs at any time within the next three 
years. The results can be fitted into the following matrix. 
 
 Crisis occurs No crisis occurs 
Signal issued A B 
No signal issued C D 
 
There are two types of forecasting error. Type I error occurs when no signal is issued 
but a crisis occurs in the ensuing period. The type I error is estimated by C/(A + C).  
A type II error occurs when a signal is issued but no crisis occurs. The type II error is 
estimated by B/(B + D). A lower type I error reflects that the indicator has a better 
predicting ability. A lower type II error implies that the indicator generates fewer false 
signals. Hence, for any given threshold, an indicator with a high predicting ratio and a 
low noise ratio is considered to be a reliable indicator. However, there is a trade-off 
                                                             
3For the build-up phase, not every positive credit-to-GDP ratio gap and distance-to-default ratio gap 
represents excessive credit growth. Choosing the optimal threshold involves a trade-off. If the 
threshold is as high as 20% above the long-term trend, then the strict threshold reduces false alarms but 
is likely to miss most crises. If the threshold is set at 1% above the long-term trend, this lax threshold is 
likely to capture all the crises but also generate a lot of false alarms. In the study, we test a set of 
thresholds and apply the rule of minimising the noise-to-signal ratio to compare the performance of 
different thresholds.  
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between type I and type II errors. On one hand, if the threshold is low, the predicting 
rate will be high as any signal can take a value of 1, but it also generates a high 
number of false alarms. On the other hand, if the threshold is high, the predicting rate 
will be low but the number of false alarms will also be lower. The trade-off of type I 
and type II errors is summarised by the noise-to-signal ratio (NS), which is equal to 
[B/(B + D)]/[A/(A + C)]. 
 
In practice, optimal empirical models for macroprudential tools need to consider the 
preference of policymakers towards type I or type II errors. For instance, 
policymakers may assign more weight to the risk of missing crises than of calling 
those that do not occur. This implies that policymakers would prefer a lower threshold 
value to avoid type I error. However, precise preferences of policymakers are not 
available in the context of macroprudential policies as there is limited experience of 
how expected loss should be estimated on type I and type II errors (Drehmann and 
Juselius, 2014). This study follows the suggestion of Drehmann et al. (2010, 2011) to 
set a minimum required fraction of correctly predicted crises at 66%.  
 
For the release phase, according to Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), the release signal 
has to be issued as a coincidence but not a long-term leading indicator as crises are 
sudden events. Because both the distance-to-default and credit-to-GDP tend to be low 
during bad times, for each period and country, the signal takes a value of 1 (release) if 
the indicator value is lower than a critical threshold in a given year while being in 
excess of the threshold in the previous year4; it takes 0 (not release) otherwise. A 
signal of 1 is judged to be correct if a crisis occurs in the given year, and a signal of 0 
is judged to be correct if no crisis occurs in the given year. Similar to the build-up 
phase, type I and II errors and noise-to-signal ratio are calculated to compare the 
                                                             
4Let ݕ௧  be an indicator variable and ܵሺݕ௧ሻ a signal which can be 0 (off) or 1 (on) depending on whether 
y is below or above a threshold value k. In release phase, the signal is: 
ܵሺݕ௧ሻ ൌ ͳ if ݕ௧ ൏ ݇ݕ௧ିଵ ൐ ݇.  
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performance of each indicator under different thresholds.  
 
3.4 Data Description  
 
The 2008 financial crisis took place mostly in the developed countries. Particularly in 
Europe, many countries experiences Sovereign Debt Crisis after the Global Financial 
Crisis. These two events provide empirical data to explore the linkage between 
financial sector and sovereign sector. Due to this reason this chapter analyses 29 
European countries, including Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Switzerland, Spain, Sweden and the UK. This sample 
not only covers most of countries from Europe but also covers countries into different 
economic groups. It includes countries from both Euro Zone and non-Euro Zone. The 
period of analysis starts at the earliest available date for each country5. All data are 
annual.  
 
Domestic and foreign debts were collected from the International Monetary Fund’s 
international financial statistics, BIS database, World Bank database and national 
authorities. Risk-free rate and exchange rate6 were collected from DataStream. Credit-
to-GDP ratio7  data are from World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) 
database. The definition of domestic credit to private sector refers to financial 
resources provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases of non-
equity securities, trade credits and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for 
repayment. Economic growth depends on many factors. For instance, inflation rate is 
                                                             
5See Annex Table-Data in the Appendix.  
6Exchange rate data are daily and then annualised.  
7World develop indicator name: domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) (FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS). 
                                                                                               Faculty of Business and Law 
 
 | P a g e  
 
38
one of the widely used indicators for forecasting GDP growth (Briault, 1995; Barro, 
1996). Modigliani (1970) presented empirical evidence that saving and GDP growth 
are positively related. Investment contributes to the GDP growth; however, 
investment cannot increase without increasing in saving. Balassa (1978) demonstrates 
that exports could contribute positively to GDP growth by increasing the competitive 
advantage of a given country. A population growth has a positive effect to a nations 
GDP growth if it can lead the increase of working force. Barro (1989) conclude that 
countries with higher human resource tend to be have higher investment to GDP. 
Therefore, this chapter choose inflation rate, export and services to GDP ratio, 
population growth rate and domestic gross saving to GDP ratio as control variables. 
The control variables are also collected from the World Bank database. 
 
Both distance-to-default and credit-to-GDP ratio are expressed as a gap. The gap is 
the difference between the current value and the long-term trend. The trend is 
measured through a one-sided Hodrick–Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter 
equal to 16008 . For robust testing, we used smoothing parameters of 6.25, 100, 
125 000 and 400 000. The choice of smoothing parameter is consistent with Borio and 
McGuire (2004) for annual data. As the trend is backward-looking, and contains only 
the information from the past, before using any trend, this study required at least five 
years of data. The performance of the distance-to-default and credit-to-GDP ratio as 
leading indicators for the CCB is assessed against banking crises. Identifying the 
exact dates of banking crisis could involve another well-established research area. To 
focus on finding the useful indicator for countercyclical capital buffer, this study 
follows the dates of banking crises in Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2012) and finds 20 
different crises. The historical banking crisis dates serve as the starting point of stress 
times. The data frequency of Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2012) is similar to this study 
                                                             
8According to Ravn and Uhlig (2002), if the data frequency is yearly then the smoothing parameter is 
6.25. Repullo and Saurina (2011) use a 400 000 smoothing parameter for annual data. When the 
parameter is 1600, it implies that the financial cycle is the same as the business cycle. When the 
parameter is 400 000, it implies that the financial cycle is four times that of the business cycle. 
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which is also yearly.  
 
Table 1 shows the summary statistic of the distance-to-default gap9, credit-to-GDP 
gap, GDP growth rate, inflation rate, export and services/GDP, population growth rate 
and domestic gross saving/GDP. The average GDP growth rate is positive for every 
sample country over its sample period. The sample countries exhibit a large 
variability and volatility in GDP growth. At one end, Lithuania has the highest 
average growth rate of 4.73%. On the other end, Portugal has the lowest growth rate 
of 0.44%. Estonia experiences the highest standard deviation of GDP growth rate of 
7.27% while France exhibits the lowest standard deviation of 1.43%. In general, the 
newly members of the EU have a higher GDP growth rate than the early members on 
average speaking.  
 
The average credit-to-GDP ratio gap also varies substantially among the sample 
countries. For instance, the highest average gap of 14.2% comes from Bulgaria while 
the lowest average gap of –3.02% is from the Czech Republic. Denmark has the most 
volatile credit-to-GDP gap with a standard deviation of 27.3% while Austria has the 
most stable credit-to-GDP gap with a standard deviation of 2.71%. These preliminary 
statistics suggest that Bulgaria and Denmark are likely to accumulate more capital 
buffer and more often than other European countries according to the CCB regulatory 
scheme.  
 
As an alternative indicator to trigger capital buffer, Table 1 shows that the average 
distance-to-default gap varies from 2.54% in Portugal to –1.83% in Hungary. In terms 
of the median distance-to-default gap, the highest median of 1.39% is in Greece 
compared with the lowest median of –5.77% in Luxembourg. It is interesting to point 
                                                             
9After the distance-to-default gap is calculated, the gap is divided by 100 as a percentage.  
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out that Portugal and Greece, who have experienced more financial distress and 
bailouts in the recent crisis also have higher distance-to-default gaps than most other 
European countries. These preliminary results are consistent with the argument that 
the distance-to-default gap may provide information on the extent of systemic risk for 
each country. Distance-to-default reflects the level of a given country to go 
bankruptcy. It is consistent with the level of a given country’s sovereign and domestic 
debt. For instance, Greece and Portugal with a high level of sovereign and domestic 
debt also have a higher possibility of default.   
 
For control variables, Luxembourg has the highest mean of export of goods and 
services (161.1%) and Ireland has the highest standard deviation of 17.4%. By 
contrast, Greece has the lowest mean and standard deviation of export of goods and 
service, 22.9% and 1.75% respectively. Romania has the highest inflation rate mean 
(10.6%) and median (11.5%) in the sample. Switzerland has the lowest inflation rate 
mean (1.21%) and median (0.83%). Hungary has the most volatile inflation rate, by 
generating a 4.85% standard deviation, seven times higher than the lowest standard 
deviation in the sample for Malta (0.69%). The mean population growth is highest in 
Luxembourg (1.56%), which also has the largest mean gross domestic savings rate 
(48.3%). By contrast, the mean of population growth rate is lowest in Lithuania (–
1.31%), and Greece has the lowest mean gross domestic savings rate (11.0%). The 
standard deviation of population growth is relatively stable compared with the other 
variables, ranging between 0.05% (Hungary) and 2.29% (Lithuania). On the other 
hand, the standard deviation of gross domestic savings varies from 1.03% 
(Netherlands) to 4.54% (Norway).  
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Summary statistics of GDP growth rate, credit-to-GDP ratio gap (C/GDP gap), distance-to-default gap (DD gap), exports of goods and services (EXP), inflation rate 
(INF), population growth rate (POP) and gross domestic savings (SVA) of 29 European countries. EXP, INF, POP and SAV are measured as percentage of GDP. 
Means, medians (Med) and standard deviations (SD) of variables are presented as percentages.  
Country GDP growth (%) Credit/GDP (%) DD (%) EXP (%) INF (%) POP (%) SAV (%) 
Mean Med SD Mean Med SD Mean Med SD Mean Med SD Mean Med SD Mean Med SD Mean Med SD 
Austria 2.32 2.47 1.58 –0.04 0.02 2.71 –0.25 –1.11 5.44 43.4 40.9 9.24 1.89 1.87 0.98 0.40 0.38 0.29 25.4 25.5 1.66 
Belgium 2.06 2.12 1.55 –0.38 –0.66 10.2 –0.93 –2.57 11.1 71.1 69.7 7.16 2.25 2.11 1.09 0.39 0.35 0.23 24.1 24.7 1.92 
Bulgaria 2.62 3.95 4.77 14.2 16.0 8.79 0.38 –0.83 3.53 58.4 58.8 6.24 6.11 5.93 2.50 –0.87 –0.52 0.80 18.5 18.8 3.81 
Czech Rep. 3.24 3.10 2.92 –3.02 –4.28 11.1 1.03 0.19 6.23 63.0 63.0 5.07 1.67 1.92 1.84 0.15 0.08 0.38 28.6 28.0 1.87 
Croatia 2.19 3.70 3.48 –0.94 –0.85 4.10 0.14 –0.21 4.36 40.8 41.9 2.70 3.94 3.91 1.66 –0.27 –0.05 0.93 19.3 20.8 3.09 
Cyprus 2.54 3.63 2.22 –1.80 –2.75 10.7 –1.73 –5.08 7.18 45.6 47.4 3.46 2.91 2.98 1.84 1.45 1.40 0.25 15.2 16.2 2.37 
Denmark 1.66 1.61 2.14 –2.07 9.59 27.3 –0.18 –1.52 5.35 42.4 38.7 6.75 2.48 2.30 1.24 0.32 0.33 0.15 24.1 24.1 1.70 
Estonia  4.38 6.56 7.27 0.78 –0.24 8.31 –0.03 –1.00 3.11 73.7 72.7 6.00 5.06 4.79 3.49 –0.24 –0.24 0.16 26.3 25.9 1.60 
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Finland 2.31 3.32 3.48 1.33 1.43 12.6 –0.67 –4.17 8.81 35.4 38.6 7.87 2.57 1.99 2.11 0.37 0.36 0.10 25.4 26.0 3.15 
France 1.82 1.83 1.43 –1.61 –3.20 6.94 –1.76 –5.61 13.6 24.2 23.6 2.57 3.40 2.08 3.34 0.55 0.55 0.11 19.5 19.6 1.14 
Germany 1.81 1.86 2.01 –0.22 –0.98 6.11 –1.51 –5.51 21.1 31.0 25.7 9.48 1.83 1.43 1.44 0.14 0.06 0.33 22.2 22.6 1.73 
Greece 1.26 3.44 4.46 4.14 3.16 7.07 2.20 1.39 14.0 22.9 23.2 1.75 2.83 2.95 1.09 0.31 0.35 0.15 11.0 11.6 2.47 
Hungary 2.43 3.71 2.93 –0.52 –0.34 9.02 –1.83 –2.10 4.56 72.0 72.0 10.7 7.25 5.40 4.85 –0.22 –0.23 0.05 23.7 23.6 1.77 
Ireland 4.31 4.73 4.02 –2.50 –5.82 15.5 –0.67 –2.24 9.65 74.3 78.2 17.4 3.62 3.16 3.88 0.94 0.77 0.79 29.5 30.6 7.29 
Italy 1.44 1.73 1.88 –0.79 –0.54 5.32 –1.30 –3.41 11.4 23.7 24.7 3.54 3.94 3.12 2.41 0.26 0.07 0.32 21.8 22.2 1.51 
Lithuania  4.73 6.86 6.97 –0.66 0.23 10.8 0.23 0.33 3.17 57.9 54.6 8.44 3.38 2.54 4.33 –1.31 –0.55 2.29 15.3 15.7 2.30 
Luxembourg 2.65 2.91 3.02 3.97 3.49 19.1 1.07 –5.77 15.0 161.1 163.5 15.5 3.53 3.73 2.70 1.56 1.54 0.34 48.3 48.7 4.07 
Malta 1.60 2.22 2.39 –2.17 –0.55 6.19 –1.71 –2.02 9.08 84.2 83.1 6.41 2.65 2.77 0.69 0.78 0.65 0.77 16.0 16.0 1.72 
Netherlands 2.42 2.44 1.81 –3.00 –3.02 10.3 –0.56 –2.06 14.4 64.2 63.0 8.37 1.93 1.85 1.26 0.54 0.60 0.17 26.8 26.9 1.03 
Norway 2.51 2.59 1.77 1.17 –0.18 5.96 –0.33 –0.53 5.20 40.4 40.3 3.76 3.99 3.82 4.42 0.66 0.58 0.29 32.1 31.0 4.54 
Poland 4.23 4.12 1.76 2.12 –0.45 6.63 0.68 –0.33 3.01 37.7 39.4 4.28 2.62 2.87 1.23 0.07 –0.05 0.30 18.7 19.2 2.08 
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Portugal 0.44 0.78 1.65 5.87 4.87 6.47 2.54 –3.67 20.7 29.9 28.1 2.67 2.29 2.52 1.07 0.29 0.33 0.43 14.8 14.4 1.81 
Romania 3.50 5.09 5.98 0.59 0.86 6.50 –1.79 –1.11 5.55 30.7 31.0 2.72 10.6 11.5 4.16 –0.21 –0.21 0.04 17.2 17.6 3.78 
Slovakia  4.83 4.92 4.04 –2.08 –2.67 6.55 0.18 0.42 1.72 79.4 78.7 6.52 2.53 2.62 2.15 0.04 0.08 0.23 23.4 23.8 2.12 
Slovenia 2.32 3.59 4.42 1.45 2.24 9.32 –1.24 –2.82 16.4 63.7 65.4 6.07 2.62 2.96 1.99 0.32 0.21 0.27 26.1 26.2 2.64 
Switzerland  1.44 1.40 1.60 0.02 2.23 5.95 0.25 –0.11 3.91 43.5 43.3 6.78 1.21 0.83 1.34 0.78 0.74 0.30 28.9 28.1 1.88 
Spain 2.74 3.25 2.11 –1.93 –2.54 15.0 –0.42 –3.22 9.84 23.3 25.7 4.51 4.42 4.16 2.45 0.69 0.35 0.59 22.8 22.9 1.32 
Sweden  2.30 2.78 2.48 0.75 –1.78 16.6 –0.09 –0.70 4.64 41.0 43.0 7.82 3.12 2.06 2.66 0.46 0.46 0.26 24.0 24.1 1.94 
UK 2.38 2.89 2.03 1.63 –2.54 14.1 –1.22 –2.45 11.8 26.8 26.6 2.39 3.38 2.77 1.87 0.39 0.31 0.18 16.0 15.8 1.85 
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Before examining the performance of the credit-to-GDP and distance-to-default gaps 
in the build-up and release phases, we first compare their correlations with GDP 
growth. An effective early warning indicator should be positively correlated with 
GDP growth to provide signals for accumulating capital buffers during good times 
and releasing capital buffers during bad times. Table 2 shows that the average 
correlation between the credit-to-GDP gap and GDP growth rate is –0.34. This 
implies that as credit to the private non-financial sector increases during economic 
upturns, the credit-to-GDP gap tends to fall, and vice versa. Therefore, the negative 
correlation with the credit-to-GDP gap as an indicator may result in a procyclical 
impact on capital buffer add-on. In contrast, the distance-to-default gap tends to be 
positively correlated with GDP growth. This positive correlation is desirable for a 
leading indicator, as capital buffers should increase during periods of high GDP 
growth and be released during periods of low growth. These correlations suggest that 
the distance-to-default gap may be more effective in triggering CCB schemes. It is 
also interesting to note that the average correlation between the distance-to-default 
gap and the credit-to-GDP gap is close to zero, which highlights that CCB schemes 
are likely to behave differently with these two indicators.  
 
Figure 2 confirms that the distance-to-default gap and the credit-to-GDP gap behave 
differently for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, all of which have 
experienced more financial distress than other European countries throughout the 
GFC. Both indicators exhibit positive gaps three to five years prior to the 2008 crisis. 
However, the credit-to-GDP gap tends to lag behind the distance-to-default gap above 
its long-term trend, suggesting that it is slower to trigger CCB regimes in the build-up 
phase. At the height and in the aftermath of the GFC, the credit-to-GDP gap is still 
well above 10% for all of the five countries and thereby would have failed to trigger a 
release of capital buffers during the crisis. By contrast, the distance-to-default gap 
drops sharply into the negative just before or at the beginning of the GFC, which 
would have allowed a quick release of capital buffers to absorb potential bank losses. 
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In the other sample countries, we found that the two indicators behaved similarly 
around the GFC. It appears that the credit-to-GDP gap is slow in accumulating capital 
buffers during good times and fails to release them during bad times.  
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
The correlations are shown between each variable: GDP growth rate is the dependent 
variable; the credit-to-GDP ratio gap (C/GDP) and distance-to-default gap (DD) are 
independent variables. Control variables include: exports of goods and services (given as a 
percentage of GDP), and inflation rate, population growth rate and gross domestic saving 
(given as a percentage of GDP). 
 GDP growth 
(%) 
C/GDP 
(%) 
DD 
(%) 
EXP 
(%) 
INF (%) POP (%) SAV 
(%) 
GDP growth 1.00       
C/GDP –0.34 1.00      
DD 0.20 0.00 1.00     
EXP 0.13 0.00 0.04 1.00    
INF 0.28 0.00 0.00 –0.03 1.00   
POP –0.08 0.02 0.06 0.14 –0.15 1.00  
SAV 0.17 –0.05 0.11 0.59 0.00 0.34 1.00 
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Figure 2. Time-series changes of distance-to-default gap and credit-to-GDP ratio gap in percentage for five economically troubled European countries. 
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3.5 Empirical results  
 
3.5.1 GDP growth, credit-to-GDP ratio gap and the distance-to-default gap 
 
To further examine the relationships of GDP growth with the credit-to-GDP gap and 
the distance-to-default gap, we included macroeconomic control variables in our 
regression tests. To effectively accumulate the CCB, the early warning indicator itself 
must be countercyclical. Therefore, it was important to test whether the correlation 
between the early warning indicator and GDP growth rate is positive across business 
cycles. Along with a number of control variables such as the inflation rate, exports 
and services as a percentage of GDP, population growth rate and domestic gross 
savings as a percentage of GDP, we ran the following pooled regressions:  
 
ܩܦܲ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߚଵܦܦ ൅ ߚଶܫܰܨ ൅ ߚଷܧܺܲ ൅ ߚସܱܲܲ ൅ ߚହܵܣܸ ൅ σ Ɂ୧ଶ଼ଵ ܦ ௜ܻ ൅ ߝ                             (Eqn 5) 
 
ܩܦܲ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߚଵܥȀܩܦܲ ൅ ߚଶܫܰܨ ൅ ߚଷܧܺܲ ൅ ߚସܱܲܲ ൅ ߚହܵܣܸ ൅ σ Ɂ୧ଶ଼ଵ ܦ ௜ܻ ൅ ߝ                       (Eqn 6) 
 
ܩܦܲ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߚଵܦܦ ൅ ߚଶܥȀܩܦܲ ൅ ߚଷܫܰܨ ൅ ߚସܧܺܲ ൅ ߚହܱܲܲ ൅ ߚ଺ܵܣܸ ൅ σ Ɂ୧ଶ଼ଵ ܦ ௜ܻ ൅ ߝ         (Eqn 7) 
 
where DD is the distance-to-default gap, C/GDP is the credit-to-GDP ratio gap, INF 
is the inflation rate, EXP is the export and services as a percentage of GDP, POP is 
the population growth rate, SAV is the domestic gross saving as a percentage of GDP, 
DY is the dummy variable. The first regression in Eqn 5 tests the correlation between 
distance-to-default and the GDP growth rate. The second regression in Eqn 6 tests the 
correlation between the credit-to-GDP ratio gap and the GDP growth rate. In Eqn 7 
both the distance-to-default gap and credit-to-GDP ratio gap are regressed on GDP 
growth rate. Inflation rate, export and services/GDP, population growth rate and 
domestic gross saving/GDP, together with 28 country dummy variables, are used as 
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control variables in all regressions10.  
 
Table 3 shows that the credit-to-GDP gap remains negatively related to GDP growth 
rate in the presence of macroeconomic control variables. The slope coefficient of the 
credit-to-GDP ratio gap is –0.08 in Eqn 6 and Eqn 7 and is statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The result is consistent with Repullo and Saurina (2011), who first 
pointed out that the credit-to-GDP gap is out of cycle with expansionary phases. 
Consistent with correlation results in Table 2, the distance-to-default gap continues to 
be positively related to GDP growth rate. The slope coefficient of distance-to-default 
is 0.05 in both Eqn 5 and Eqn 7 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. These 
results reinforce the view that distance-to-default is likely to be a better choice for 
implementing CCB schemes as it co-moves positively with business cycles.  
  
                                                             
10 The variables in the equations are stationary.  
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Table 3. Regression analysis 
The ordinary least square regression results for Eqn 5, Eqn 6 and Eqn 7. 
ܩܦܲ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߚଵܦܦ ൅ ߚଶܫܰܨ ൅ ߚଷܧܺܲ ൅ ߚସܱܲܲ ൅ ߚହܵܣܸ ൅ σ Ɂ୧ଶ଼ଵ ܦ ௜ܻ ൅ ߝ                      
ܩܦܲ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߚଵܥȀܩܦܲ ൅ ߚଶܫܰܨ ൅ ߚଷܧܺܲ ൅ ߚସܱܲܲ ൅ ߚହܵܣܸ ൅ σ Ɂ୧ଶ଼ଵ ܦ ௜ܻ ൅ ߝ                   
ܩܦܲ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߚଵܦܦ ൅ ߚଶܥȀܩܦܲ ൅ ߚଷܫܰܨ ൅ ߚସܧܺܲ ൅ ߚହܱܲܲ ൅ ߚ଺ܵܣܸ ൅ σ Ɂ୧ଶ଼ଵ ܦ ௜ܻ ൅ ߝ           
where DD is the distance-to-default gap, C/GDP is the credit-to-GDP gap, INF is inflation rate, EXP is 
the exports and services as percentage of GDP, POP is the population growth rate, SAV is the gross 
domestic savings as percentage of GDP and ܦ ௜ܻ are dummy variables for 28 countries. Superscripts *, 
**, *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics. The results are based on pooled sample.  
 Eqn 5 Eqn 6 Eqn 7 
Dependent variable    
 GDP growth rate    
Independent variable    
 Intercept –4.38*** 
(–3.24) 
–4.96*** 
(–3.92) 
–3.92*** 
(–3.10) 
 DD gap 0.05*** 
(4.24) 
 0.05*** 
(4.48) 
 C/GDP gap  –0.08*** 
(–8.16) 
–0.08*** 
(–8.29) 
Control variables    
 Export –0.01 
(–0.29) 
0.00 
(–0.09) 
0.00 
(0.25) 
 Inflation 0.32*** 
(5.49) 
0.31*** 
(5.56) 
0.32*** 
(5.92) 
 Population –0.69*** 
(–2.72) 
–0.47** 
(–1.93) 
–0.50** 
(2.11) 
 Saving 0.26*** 
(4.18) 
0.27*** 
(4.67) 
0.22*** 
(3.76) 
Dummy variables Yes Yes Yes 
 Adj. R2 0.23 0.30 0.32 
Number of observations 511 511 511 
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3.5.2 The build-up phase 
 
In sequel to our preliminary analysis, we applied the signal extraction methods based 
on Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Borio and Drehmann (2009) to assess the 
performance of the distance-to-default and credit-to-GDP gaps in the build-up phase 
of CCB. Table 4 shows that the type I error using the distance-to-default gap as the 
trigger for CCB schemes is lower than that of the credit-to-GDP gap across all critical 
thresholds from 0% to 6%. In other words, regardless of which critical threshold is 
chosen, the distance-to-default gap always outperformed the credit-to-GDP ratio gap 
in issuing correct warnings signals when financial crises took place. In relation to the 
type II error (i.e. issuing a false warning when no crisis occurred), the distance-to-
default gap again outperformed the credit-to-GDP gap across all critical thresholds 
except at the 0% level, which means the distance-to-default gap outperforms the 
credit-to-GDP ratio in issuing fewer false alarms in normal periods. 
 
Consistent with the results in the type I and II errors, Table 4 also shows that the 
distance-to-default gap exhibits higher predicted ratio and lower noise-to-signal ratio 
across all critical thresholds. More specifically, the predicted ratios of the distance-to-
default gap range from 57% at the 6% threshold to 87% at the 0% threshold compared 
with those of the credit-to-GDP ratio gap, which range from 32% to 62% respectively. 
Similarly, the noise-to-signal ratios vary from 0.25 to 0.45 for the distance-to-default 
gap relative to those from 0.52 to 0.61 for the credit-to-GDP ratio gap. The overall 
results in Table 4 suggest that distance-to-default overshadows the credit-to-GDP as a 
leading indicator in terms of more accurate forecasts on financial crises and fewer 
false alarms. According to Borio and Drehamnn (2009), a good critical threshold to 
trigger the build-up phase is to minimise the noise-to-signal ratio while subject to a 
predicted ratio of at least 66%. No critical thresholds under the credit-to-GDP gap 
meet the criteria. In contrast, more than half of the critical thresholds based on the 
distance-to-default gap exceed the criteria. More specifically, the distance-to-default 
gap at 3% threshold achieves the lowest noise-to-signal ratio (0.28) while still 
predicting 75% of the crises in the sample. The higher the noise-to-signal ratio of 
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credit-to-GDP the more false alarms it creates in comparison with those raised by the 
distance-to-default gap. By achieving a much higher predicted rate, the distance-to-
default gap generates more accurate signals than the credit-to-GDP ratio gap. Overall, 
with lower noise-to-signal ratio and higher predicted rate, the distance-to-default can 
provide better signals than the credit-to-GDP gap during the build-up phase.  
 
It is interesting to note that, based on either the distance-to-default gap or the credit-
to-GDP ratio gap as the indicator for CCB schemes, the 3% threshold appears to be 
the optimal trigger level among all other critical levels in the build-up phase. At this 
critical threshold, the predicted ratios are 75% and 50% and the noise-to-signal ratios 
are 0.28 and 0.52 using the distance-to-default gap and the credit-to-GDP gap 
respectively. Although one can lower the critical threshold to 2% or below to improve 
the predicted ratio, false warnings, as indicated by the noise-to-signal ratio, also 
increase. The converse is true if we raise the critical threshold to strike a balance 
between these two ratios. However, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) argue 
that the predicted ratio should weigh more than the noise-to-signal ratio because the 
consequences of not predicting a financial crisis are more severe.  
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Table 4. Signal extraction for build-up phase 
Type I and type II errors, the predicting rate (predicted) and the noise-to-signal ratio (NS) 
generated by the distance-to-default (DD) gap and credit-to-GDP ratio gap in the signal 
extraction process for the build-up phase. A signal is equal to 1 if issued when the 
conditioning variable exceeds the threshold. Otherwise the signal is equal to 0. A signal of 1 is 
judged to be correct if a crisis occurs any time within a three-year horizon, and a signal of 0 is 
judged to be correct if no crisis occurs within a three-year horizon. Type I error occurs if no 
signal is issued and a crisis occurs; type II error occurs if a signal is issued and no crisis 
occurs. The column ‘predicted’ refers to the percentage of crises predicted correctly. The 
noise-to-signal ratio (NS) refers to the trade-off between type I and type II errors.  
Threshold Type I error Type II error Predicted NS 
 DD C/GDP DD C/GDP DD C/GDP DD C/GDP 
0% 13% 38% 39% 38% 87% 62% 0.45 0.61 
1% 18% 42% 32% 33% 82% 58% 0.39 0.57 
2% 22% 43% 26% 30% 78% 57% 0.33 0.53 
3% 25% 50% 21% 26% 75% 50% 0.28 0.52 
4% 35% 60% 18% 24% 65% 40% 0.28 0.60 
5% 38% 67% 16% 21% 62% 33% 0.26 0.63 
6% 43% 68% 14% 18% 57% 32% 0.25 0.57 
 
3.5.3 The release phase  
 
Table 5 highlights the performance of the distance-to-default gap and the credit-to-
GDP ratio gap in the release phase. We varied the range of critical thresholds from 0% 
to –6% for releasing capital buffers. The type I error using the distance-to-default gap 
as the trigger for CCB release phase was lower than that of credit-to-GDP gap across 
all critical thresholds. In other words, regardless of which critical threshold was 
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chosen, the distance-to-default gap always outperformed the credit-to-GDP ratio gap 
in issuing fewer false release signals. In contrast, the type II error was relatively low 
across all critical thresholds for both the credit-to-GDP gap and the distance-to-
default gap. 
 
Table 5. Signal extraction for release phase 
Type I and type II errors, the prediction rate (predicted) and the noise-to-signal ratio (NS) 
generated by the distance-to-default gap and credit-to-GDP ratio gap in the signal extraction 
process for the release phase. A signal is equal to 1 if issued when the conditioning variable 
exceeds the threshold. Otherwise the signal is equal to 0. A signal of 1 is judged to be correct 
if a crisis occurs any time within a three-year horizon, a signal of 0 is judged to be correct if 
no crisis occurs within three-years. Type I error occurs if no signal is issued and a crisis 
occurs. Type II error occurs if a signal is issued and no crisis occurs. The column ‘Predicted’ 
refers to the percentage of crises predicted correctly. The noise-to-signal ratio (NS) refers to 
the trade-off between type I and type II errors.  
Threshold Type I error Type II error Predicted NS 
 DD C/GDP DD C/GDP DD C/GDP DD C/GDP 
0% 5% 90% 12% 7% 95% 10% 0.13 0.70 
–1% 5% 95% 13% 6% 95% 5% 0.14 1.2 
–2% 10% 95% 12% 6% 90% 5% 0.13 1.2 
–3% 15% 95% 12% 6% 85% 5% 0.14 1.2 
–4% 25% 95% 9% 6% 75% 5% 0.12 1.2 
–5% 25% 95% 8% 5% 75% 5% 0.11 1.0 
–6% 30% 95% 7% 6% 70% 5% 0.10 1.2 
 
There are two possible reasons for a low type II error result: (i) the indictors are less 
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sensitive or (ii) the indictors are less accurate. The credit-to-GDP ratio gap is a 
macroeconomic variable with a considerable lag effect. As financial crises often occur 
unexpectedly, the backward-looking nature of credit-to-GDP gap is not able to capture 
the crisis (Drehmann et al., 2010, 2011). As a result, the credit-to-GDP gap usually 
sends no signal of release during the pre-crisis period. The insensitiveness is further 
proven by an extremely low predicted rate that is 5% across all thresholds except 0%. 
Though the credit-to-GDP gap generates a low type II error, it is at the cost of missing 
a real release signal. By contrast, the distance-to-default gap does not only have a low 
type II error but also has a remarkably high prediction rate across the board.  
 
The noise-to-signal ratio summarises the trade-off between type I and type II errors of 
a given indicator. Table 5 shows that the distance-to-default gap exhibits higher 
predicted ratio and lower noise-to-signal ratio across all critical thresholds. More 
specifically, the predicted ratios of the distance-to-default gap ranged from 95% at the 
0% threshold to 70% at the –6% threshold compared with those of the credit-to-GDP 
ratio gap, which were all below the critical level of 66%. Similarly, the noise-to-signal 
ratio varied from 0.14 to 0.10 for the distance-to-default gap compared with 1.2 to 0.7 
for the credit-to-GDP ratio gap. The distance-to-default gap at –6% threshold 
achieved the lowest noise-to-signal ratio (0.10) while still predicting 70% of the crises 
in the sample. This performance is superior, as the credit-to-GDP could only produce 
10% predicted rate and generate a 0.7 noise-to-signal ratio. Overall, with lower noise-
to-signal ratio and higher predicted rate, the distance-to-default gap can provide more 
reliable signals than the credit-to-GDP gap during the release phase.  
 
Drehmann et al. (2010, 2011) mention that market-based indicators like credit spread 
could provide useful release signals, but tend to be too noisy. Accuracy is important 
for release phase indicators because releasing CCB at the wrong time can be costly. 
Using a noisy indicator may fuel the credit boom by providing more funds to the 
economy. Moreover, it takes time for banks to rebuild the buffer. Therefore, when a 
real crisis occurs, banks may not have enough buffer to absorb it. The results in Table 
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5 show that the distance-to-default gap has a very low noise-to-signal ratio across all 
thresholds, mitigating the noise problem. The overall results in Table 5 suggest that 
distance-to-default is superior to the credit-to-GDP as a release phase indicator in 
terms of more accurate forecasts of financial crises and fewer false alarms of financial 
crises that fail to eventuate. 
 
3.6 Robustness tests: measuring distance-to-default using stock market 
volatility 
 
In 1999, the euro was introduced into 11 European countries as the official currency 
of the euro zone. Now the euro is used by 19 of 28 member states of the European 
Union: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. The exchange volatility of the countries that originally 
adopted the euro was the same for 1999. To test robustness, this study used stock 
market volatility as input to generate the distance-to-default.  
 
Table 6 highlights that the distance-to-default gap is positively related to GDP growth 
across all regressions while the credit-to-GDP ratio gap remains negative relative to 
GDP growth. These results are consistent with those reported in Table 3 based on 
exchange rate volatility. The slope coefficients of distance-to-default in Eqn 5 and 
Eqn 7 are 0.05 and 0.04 respectively, both statistically significant at the 1% level. By 
contrast, the slope coefficients of the credit-to-GDP ratio in Eqn 6 and Eqn 7 are –
0.08 and –0.07 respectively, also statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
robustness test results reinforce the view that distance-to-default is a better choice for 
implementing CCB schemes than the credit-to-GDP ratio as it co-moves positively 
with business cycles.  
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Table 6. Robustness of regression analysis 
The robustness check for the ordinary least square regression estimations in Eqn 5, Eqn 6 and 
Eqn 7. The stock market volatility is used as a substitute for the exchange rate volatility to 
generate the distance-to-default.  
ܩܦܲ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߚଵܦܦ ൅ ߚଶܫܰܨ ൅ ߚଷܧܺܲ ൅ ߚସܱܲܲ ൅ ߚହܵܣܸ ൅ σ Ɂ୧ଶ଼ଵ ܦ ௜ܻ ൅ ߝ  
ܩܦܲ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߚଵܥȀܩܦܲ ൅ ߚଶܫܰܨ ൅ ߚଷܧܺܲ ൅ ߚସܱܲܲ ൅ ߚହܵܣܸ ൅ σ Ɂ୧ଶ଼ଵ ܦ ௜ܻ ൅ ߝ  
ܩܦܲ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߚଵܦܦ ൅ ߚଶܥȀܩܦܲ ൅ ߚଷܫܰܨ ൅ ߚସܧܺܲ ൅ ߚହܱܲܲ ൅ ߚ଺ܵܣܸ ൅ σ Ɂ୧ଶ଼ଵ ܦ ௜ܻ ൅ ߝ  
where DD is the distance-to-default gap, C/GDP is the credit-to-GDP gap, INF is inflation 
rate, EXP is the exports and services as percentage of GDP, POP is the population growth 
rate, SAV is the gross domestic savings as percentage of GDP and ܦ ௜ܻ are dummy variables 
for 28 countries. DD is the distance-to-default gap; C/GDP is the credit-to-GDP gap; 
superscripts *, **, *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  
 Eqn 5 Eqn 6 Eqn 7 
Dependent variable    
 GDP growth rate    
Independent variable    
 Intercept –4.13*** 
(–3.14) 
–4.73*** 
(–3.71) 
–4.38*** 
(–3.43) 
 DD gap 0.05*** 
(3.09) 
 0.04** 
(2.49) 
 C/GDP gap  –0.08*** 
(–7.66) 
–0.07*** 
(–7.41) 
Control variables    
 Export –0.03 
(–1.12) 
–0.03 
(–1.29) 
–0.02 
(–1.02) 
 Inflation 0.30*** 
(4.70) 
0.30*** 
(5.01) 
0.31*** 
(5.09) 
 Population –0.77*** 
(–2.92) 
–0.51** 
(–2.01) 
–0.56** 
(–2.24) 
 Saving 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 
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(4.98) (5.13) (4.76) 
Dummy variables Yes Yes Yes 
 Adjusted R2 0.23 0.31 0.32 
Number of observations 465 465 465 
 
 
Table 7 outlines the robustness test results for the CCB build-up phase from the signal 
extraction method. It shows that the type I error using the distance-to-default gap as 
the trigger for CCB schemes is lower than that of the credit-to-GDP gap across all 
critical thresholds. In relation to the type II error (i.e. issuing a false warning when no 
crisis occurred), the distance-to-default gap again outperforms the credit-to-GDP gap 
across all critical thresholds except at the 0% level. The distance-to-default gap at 1% 
threshold achieves the lowest noise-to-signal ratio (0.39) while still predicting 82% of 
the crises in the sample. By contrast, there is no threshold of the credit-to-GDP ratio 
gap that satisfies the 66% predicted rate rule. Overall, with lower noise-to-signal ratio 
and higher predicted rate, the robustness tests confirm that distance-to-default can 
provide better signals than the credit-to-GDP gap during the build-up phase.  
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Table 7. Robustness of signal extraction for build-up phase 
The robustness check for results generated from the signal extraction process for the build-up 
phase. Stock market volatility is used as a substitute for exchange rate volatility to generate 
the distance-to-default. A signal is equal to 1 if issued when the conditioning variable exceeds 
the threshold; otherwise the signal is equal to 0. A signal of 1 is judged to be correct if a crisis 
occurs any time within a three-year horizon, and a signal of 0 is judged to be correct if no 
crisis occurs any time within a three-year horizon. Type I error occurs if no signal is issued 
and a crisis occurs; type II error occurs if a signal is issued and no crisis occurs. The column 
‘predicted’ refers to the percentage of crises predicted correctly. The noise-to-signal ratio 
(NS) refers to the trade-off between type I and type II errors. DD is the distance-to-default 
gap; C/GDP is the credit-to-GDP gap. 
Threshold Type I error Type II error Predicted NS 
% DD C/GDP DD C/GDP DD C/GDP DD C/GDP 
0 12% 38% 44% 40% 88% 62% 0.50 0.65 
1 18% 42% 32% 35% 82% 58% 0.39 0.60 
2 37% 43% 26% 33% 63% 57% 0.41 0.58 
3 43% 50% 19% 28% 57% 50% 0.33 0.56 
4 48% 60% 17% 25% 52% 40% 0.33 0.63 
5 57% 67% 14% 22% 43% 33% 0.33 0.67 
6 58% 68% 10% 20% 42% 32% 0.24 0.63 
 
 
Table 8 outlines the performance of the distance-to-default gap and the credit-to-GDP 
ratio gap during the CCB release phase. Type I error uses the distance-to-default gap 
as the trigger for CCB release, which is comparatively lower than that of the credit-to-
GDP gap across all critical thresholds. As the release of CCB requires immediate 
action, the distance-to-default gap is a more accurate indicator than the credit-to-GDP 
gap due to fewer type I errors. However, type II errors for both distance-to-default and 
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credit-to-GDP gaps were relatively low. There are two possible reasons for low type II 
error results: (i) the indictors are less sensitive or (ii) the indictors are less accurate. 
The backward-looking nature of the credit-to-GDP gap is not able to capture the 
crisis. As a result, the credit-to-GDP gap usually sends no signal of release during a 
pre-crisis period. The insensitiveness is further proven by extremely low predicted 
rates across all thresholds. 
 
Though the credit-to-GDP gap generates few type II errors, it is at the cost of missing 
real release signals. On the other hand, the distance-to-default gap does not only 
generates few type II errors but also has a remarkably higher predicted rate across the 
board. At the 1% threshold, the distance-to-default gap achieved the lowest noise-to-
signal ratio of 0.14 while still predicting 95% of the crises in the sample. Thus, the 
distance-to-default gap outperformed the credit-to-GDP gap, which generated the 
lowest noise-to-signal ratio of 0.70. Overall, the distance-to-default is a reliable 
indicator for the CCB release phase as it provides a low noise-to-signal ratio while 
predicting more than 66% of the crises.  
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Table 8. Robustness of signal extraction for release phase 
The robustness check for results generated from the signal extraction process for the release 
phase. Stock market volatility is used as a substitute for the exchange rate volatility to 
generate the distance-to-default. A signal is equal to 1 if issued when the conditioning 
variable exceeds the threshold. Otherwise the signal is equal to 0. A signal of 1 is judged to be 
correct if a crisis occurs any time within a three-year horizon; a signal of 0 is judged to be 
correct if no crisis occurs any time within a three-year horizon. Type I error occurs if no 
signal is issued and a crisis occurs. Type II error occurs if a signal is issued and no crisis 
occurs. ‘Predicted’ refers to the percentage of crises predicted correctly. The noise-to-signal 
ratio (NS) refers to the trade-off between type I and type II errors. DD is the distance-to-
default gap; C/GDP is the credit-to-GDP gap. 
Threshold Type I error Type II error Predicted NS 
 DD C/GDP DD C/GDP DD C/GDP DD C/GDP 
0% 5% 90% 14% 7% 95% 10% 0.15 0.70 
–1% 5% 95% 13% 7% 95% 5% 0.14 1.4 
–2% 10% 95% 14% 7% 90% 5% 0.16 1.4 
–3% 30% 95% 11% 6% 70% 5% 0.16 1.2 
–4% 35% 95% 10% 5% 65% 5% 0.15 1.0 
–5% 45% 95% 7% 5% 55% 5% 0.13 1.0 
–6% 50% 95% 5% 5% 50% 5% 0.10 1.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                               Faculty of Business and Law 
 
 | P a g e  
 
61
3.7 Chapter Conclusions 
 
One of the most destabilising elements of the financial system is the procyclical 
amplification mechanism that operates between the broader economy and the 
financial system (Borio et al., 2001; Brunnermeier et al., 2009). In 2010 the Basel 
Committee developed a macroprudential instrument called the countercyclical capital 
buffer (CCB), to fully account for the risk of an amplifying spiral. To achieve such an 
objective, the buffer should build up during good times, when it is easy and cheap to 
do, so banks can have an addition capital cushion to draw down in bad times.  
 
In the spirit of the macrofinancial risk framework proposed by Gray et al. (2006), the 
present study proposes the sovereign sector distance-to-default gap as a new early 
warning indicator for setting the CCB. As the distance-to-default gap is theoretically 
developed on the basis of financial market volatility and market prices of balance 
sheet items of the sovereign sector, the measure can provide a better way to assess 
probabilities of default for different sectors and sovereigns as a whole. As the 
indicator can be constructed with high frequencies, statistical empirical tests on its 
efficiency in timely guiding of the CCB can be performed more accurately. 
 
Our empirical analysis shows that the sovereign sector distance-to-default gap is 
consistently positively correlated with GDP growth, and is therefore considered 
countercyclical. The results from the signal extraction method and robustness tests 
show that the distance-to-default gap outperforms the credit-to-GDP ratio gap as an 
indicator in the build-up phase and provides more accurate signals in the release 
phase. The measure can increase as early as three years before a crisis and therefore 
would allow banks to build up sufficient capital buffer in a leading time period. In 
times of stress, the measure drops quickly, which can send a prompt release signal for 
the buffer to absorb losses. 
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Compare to other studies on relationship between sovereign sector and financial 
sector, this study extend the study of sovereign sector into a more comprehensive area 
which can be used to monitor the stability of an entire economy. The results from this 
chapter highlight the importance of a sovereign contingent claim analysis framework 
in monitoring systemic risk from a macroprudential view. As demonstrated in this 
chapter, sovereign contingent claim analysis framework indictors, such as distance-to-
default, may be superior to the credit-to-GDP ratio in capturing the build-up of 
systemic risk prior to banking crises and timely release of accurate signals when 
crises occur. The framework should play a more important role in future 
macrofinancial risk management to protect the stability of the banking sector and 
prevent shocks to the financial system being transmitted to the rest of the financial 
system. 
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Chapter 4 – Market Illiquidity and Financial Crisis 
 
4.1 The Systemic Role of Liquidity Risk in Financial Stability 
 
The GFC provided an object lesson in the systemic role of liquidity in financial 
stability. Problems that originated in the subprime mortgage sector of the US led to a 
drying up of liquidity in the financial system globally. The sudden loss of liquidity 
caused falls in asset values, which led to distress in certain financial institutions and 
caused turmoil in credit markets. Moreover, liquidity demonstrates a contagion 
feature that affects not only the US financial system, but also transfers risks to global 
financial markets. Banking institutions in the UK and Germany, which are far from 
the origin of the crisis, have had to be rescued.  
 
Liquidity problems are closely related to the emergence of the shadow banking 
system, an important component of the market-based financial system. According to 
the official report by the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, “over the past 30 
plus years, we permitted the growth of a shadow banking system – opaque and laden 
with short-term debt – that rivalled the size of the traditional banking system”. Gorton 
and Metrick (2012) demonstrate that a market-based financial system can create 
short-term debt and long-term loan mismatches, which is the same as the traditional 
banking system. However, there is no effective insurance to support the enormous 
liabilities created by the shadow banking system. More importantly, the shadow 
banking system is closely linked with the traditional banking system in several ways, 
including collateral financing, derivative trading and securitisation processes. These 
contingent liabilities created by the shadow banking system can eventually transfer 
into the regulated part of the financial system. Because banking capital requirements 
do not take these contingent liabilities into account, during the GFC, public sectors 
around the world had to rescue financial systems using extra resources. Mehrling 
(2011) argues that “it is not just the shadow banks but, more important, the larger 
capital market-based credit system that failed, and it is that failure that we must 
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understand if we are to put the system back together again, and on more solid 
foundation this time”.  
 
As demonstrated by the GFC, liquidity is the key to understanding the procyclicality 
within the market-based financial system. During boom times, the increase in asset 
values causes collateral values to rise, and then generates additional lending by 
financial institutions. Financial institutions that have financed positions through 
leverage profit most during this upswing. These gains provide borrowers with the 
incentive and the means to borrow more from both domestic and international funding 
markets. Therefore, leverage tends to increase, and risk exposures of financial 
institutions also increase. In this phase, credit costs seem to be low, liquidity is cheap 
and easily available, volatility is moderate, and competitor institutions aggressively 
pursue market opportunities. Moreover, during the years of economic expansion 
before 2007 there was a gradual erosion of risk management standards applied to 
secured lending. As a result, the borrowing rates of funding markets fell to low levels, 
and other credit terms were loosened in response to competitive pressure.  
 
All booms end in a bust. Eventually, a trigger signals a change in the economic cycle. 
Individual institutions or market players watch declines in asset prices and shrinkage 
of their capital cushions, which leads them to reduce risk exposures that they build up 
during good times in order to protect their liquidity. Moreover, declining prices have 
the further effect of raising perceived volatility and drive up financial institutions’ 
‘value-at-risk’. The individual institution reacts to these effects by reducing risk 
exposures once again. The collective effect for the financial system is that funding 
liquidity and market liquidity can dry up in a very short of time. Without liquidity, the 
market-based financial system collapses. In addition, the liquidity shortage of one 
market could easily transfer to the markets of other countries through internationally 
operated financial institutions and international funding markets, and consequently 
cause a global liquidity crisis.  
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One key challenge for regulators and policymakers is to identify and manage all 
possible sources of systemic risk that could put the banking system into costly crisis. 
The major purpose of this chapter is to generate a more comprehensive guiding 
indicator for CCB than the credit-to-GDP ratio; one that can capture the 
interconnections between: (i) the regulated and unregulated sectors of the financial 
system; (ii) domestic and international systemic risk; and (iii) funding liquidity and 
market liquidity. To fulfil such purposes, this research proposes stock market 
illiquidity. In this research, stock market illiquidity is calculated by an endogenous 
measure of an illiquidity lookback option pioneered by Longstaff (1995). This 
measure can be viewed as the maximum cost for regulators to maintain the liquidity 
of the whole financial system. It transfers shocks and asset decline into a forward-
looking quantitative indicator that can be used as a proxy for systemic market 
illiquidity. To be specific, the focus of this systemic market illiquidity measure is on 
the three properties of liquidity: endogenous, forward-looking and contagion. In 
accordance with these three properties, market illiquidity appears to be an ideal 
indicator for the macroprudential CCB. It is also able to capture risk transfers and 
contagion effects that are caused by cross-border banking and global liquidity. By 
contrast, as an indicator, the credit-to-GDP ratio barely captures the cross-border 
systemic risk exposures of a given economy (Borio and Drehmann, 2009; Arnold et 
al., 2012). In contrast, previous research on the valuation of illiquid securities only 
treated the bid-ask spread or transaction costs as an exogenous indicator (e.g. Amihud 
and Mendelson, 1986; Vayanos and Vila, 1992; Amihud, 2002). Another advantage 
of the market illiquidity option framework is that stock market index price data are 
available for a large number of countries and for a longer period than other market-
based data such as credit default swap spreads.  
 
In comparing the performance of different indicators, this chapter is in line with 
Drehmann and Juselius (2014), who evaluated the forecast performance of early 
warning indicators using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve analysis. The 
                                                                                               Faculty of Business and Law 
 
 | P a g e  
 
66
ROC is able to capture the trade-off between type I and type II errors for a full range 
of policymaker preferences. Drawn from a sample of 17 countries, the results in this 
chapter show that market illiquidity not only outperforms the credit-to-GDP ratio 
during the buffer build-up phase, but also provides a contemporaneous indicator for 
signalling the buffer release phase. By contrast, the credit-to-GDP ratio gap does not 
have near-coincident properties, as there are no meaningful results from the ROC 
analysis.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows: section 4.2 and 4.3 presents the methodology; 
section 4.4 presents the data; section 4.5 provides empirical results; and section 4.6 
concludes the chapter.  
 
4.2 Measure of Market Illiquidity  
 
This chapter follows Longstaff’s (1995) framework whereby the current value of a 
floating lookback option is used as a proxy for stock market illiquidity. The lookback 
option is considered to have a payoff at maturity that is equal to the difference 
between the maximum of the price of the underlying asset and the strike price. The 
lookback option assumes a maximum upper bound for an investor to achieve. It can 
be viewed as the maximum amount that any investor would be willing to pay in order 
to obtain immediacy in liquidating a security position. Thus, this upper bound 
provides an endogenous measure of the largest possible bid-ask spread or transaction 
cost for a given market (Longstaff, 1995). An important advantage of this framework 
is that it does not need to make additional assumptions about informational 
asymmetries and investors’ preferences that would be required in a full general 
equilibrium model. In addition, the inputs of the framework are simple and 
transparent.  
 
4.2.1 The Setup 
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Let V denote the current or ‘time-zero’ value of a security that is continuously traded 
in a frictionless market. Then assume the equilibrium dynamics of V are given by the 
stochastic process:  
 
ܸ݀ ൌ ߤܸ݀ݐ ൅ ߪܸܼ݀                                                                                                    (Eqn 8) 
 
where ȣ and Ȫ are constant and Z is a standard Wiener process. Further assume the 
riskless interest rate r is constant.  
 
4.2.2 Marketability Restriction 
 
Consider a hypothetical investor who holds the security in his portfolio but is 
restricted from selling the security prior to some fixed time T. The value of this 
security to the investor equals the present value of a cash flow of ்ܸ to be received at 
time T. Now assume that this investor has perfect market timing ability that would 
allow him to sell the security and reinvest the proceeds in the riskless asset at the time 
ȫ that maximises the value of his portfolio. Let ܯ் denote the time T payoff to this 
investor if the sale could be timed optimally, where ܯ் ൌ ଴ஸఛا்ሺ݁௥ሺ்ିఛሻ ఛܸሻ. 
As long as the investor cannot sell the security prior to time T, he cannot benefit from 
having perfect market timing ability.  
 
4.2.3 Market Illiquidity Measurement 
 
This marketability restriction imposes an important opportunity cost on this 
hypothetical investor as the security position is only worth ்ܸ to the investor at time T 
if he is restricted from selling, but would be worth ܯ் if he was allowed to sell earlier. 
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Thus, using a standard dominance or no-arbitrage argument, the value of liquidity to 
an investor with perfect market timing ability is simply the present value of the 
incremental cash flow ܯ் െ ்ܸ  that the investor would receive if there was no 
liquidity restriction. Clearly, the value of liquidity would be less for an actual investor 
with imperfect market timing ability. Thus, the present value of the incremental cash 
flow ܯ் െ ்ܸ  represents an endogenous upper bound on the value of market liquidity.  
 
The value of the lookback option is a function of three variables (V, M, t) with the 
boundary condition 0 d V d M. The incremental cash flow ܯ் െ ்ܸ can be viewed as 
the payoff from an option on the maximum value of the security ܯ், where the strike 
price of the option ்ܸ  is stochastic. As ୘ ൒ ்ܸ , this lookback option will always be 
in the money at expiration. Hence, ሺͲǡܯ் െ ்ܸ ሻ ൌ ܯ் െ ்ܸ . Alternatively, the 
cash flow ܯ் െ ்ܸ  can be viewed as the payoff of liquidity swap in which ்  is 
swapped for ܯ் at time T. Described by Wilmott (2006), the governing equation of 
the lookback option is the Black–Scholes partial differential equation:              
                                                   
 ఋ௏ఋ௧ ൅
ଵ
ଶ ߪ
ଶܵଶ ఋ
మ௏
ఋௌమ ൅ ݎܵ
ఋ௏
ఋௌ െ ݎܸ ൌ Ͳ                                                                            (Eqn9) 
 
Combining the Black–Scholes partial differential equation and the boundary condition, 
the present value of ܯ் െ ்ܸ  is equal to a floating strike lookback put option 
(Wilmott, 2006):  
 
ܯ݁ି௥ሺ்ିఛሻܰሺെ݀ଶሻ െ ܸ݁ି௥ሺ்ିఛሻܰሺെ݀ଵሻ ൅ ܸ݁ି௥ሺ்ିఛሻ
ఙమ
ଶ௥ ൈ ൬െሺ
௏
ெሻ
ିమೝ഑మܰሺ݀ଵ െ
ଶ௥ξ்ିఛ
ఙ ൅
݁௥ሺ்ିఛሻܰሺ݀ଵሻ൰                                                                                                            (Eqn 10)          
                 
where, 
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݀ଵ ൌ
݈݋݃ ቀܸܯቁ ൅ ቀݎ ൅
ͳ
ʹߪ
ଶቁ ሺܶ െ ߬ሻ
ߪξܶ െ ߬
 
 
݀ଶ ൌ ݀ଵ െ ߪξܶ െ ߬ 
 
where V is the value of the security at T, M is the realised maximum value of the 
security, Ȫ is the stock market volatility and r is the risk-free rate.  
 
Unlike Longstaff’s framework, this thesis uses the stock market index as input instead 
of using single security in order to calculate the market illiquidity condition as a 
whole. In contrast to Amihud (2002), this market illiquidity option framework is a 
top-down approach as it does not need to take an average process on each stock’s 
liquidity to generate a systemic liquidity condition. Amihud’s method does not 
consider the correlations between each stock and is microprudential in nature. By 
contrast, the market illiquidity option framework in this chapter offers a way to 
calculate systemic liquidity condition with a macroprudential view.  
 
In practice, the market is liquid if transactions can take place rapidly and with little 
impact on price (Borio, 2004). The value of the lookback option can also be 
considered as insurance for investors to hold against market illiquidity. The 
relationship between the value of the lookback option and market illiquidity is as 
follows: 
(1) when the value of the lookback option is small, it reflects a liquid market with 
little impact on price;  
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(2) when the value of the lookback option is high, it reflects an illiquid market 
with a large impact on price.  
 
4.3 Method for Signal Evaluation – Receiver Operating Characteristic 
Analysis 
 
4.3.1 Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve  
 
This study employed receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve analysis, which is 
well known in the diagnostic decision-making literature to evaluate the ability of an 
indicator to generate consistent and correct warning signals for regulators and 
policymakers. One major advantage of using the ROC method is the ability to take 
policymakers’ risk aversion preference into account. The method assumes that the 
economy is in one of three states: a normal state; a pre-crisis boom state (‘good 
times’); or a crisis state (‘bad times’). As the crisis state is always observed, 
policymakers only focus on the unobservable normal (B = 0) and pre-crisis boom (B 
= 1) states to implement their policies. For a given value of the indicator, 
policymakers want to evaluate the probability of the economy being in either one or 
the other state. Based on this probability, they can decide to implement a policy (P = 
1) or not (P = 0). The ROC method can be explained as follows. 
 
Let k be the threshold of the crisis condition. If the signal S of an early warning 
indicator lies above the threshold, then the economy is considered to be in a boom, 
otherwise the economy is considered to be in its normal state. This leads to four 
possible outcomes, summarised in the following matrix. 
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Signal (S) \ real state (B) Pre-crisis boom (B = 1) Normal state (B = 0) 
Pre-crisis boom (S ≥ k) True positive False positive 
Normal state (S < k) False negative True negative 
 
The true positive and true negative cases correspond to the situations in which the 
signal correctly identifies the pre-crisis boom and the normal state respectively. The 
false positive corresponds to a false alarm or sounding a crisis when there is none, and 
the false negative corresponds to no signal issued but a crisis occurring. In other 
words, a false positive corresponds to the statistical type II error of the signal 
extraction method and a false negative corresponds to the statistical type I error of the 
signal extraction method.  
 
The true positive rate (TPR) is the probability of generating correct alarms and a 
policy being correctly implemented before a crisis happens (P = 1, B = 1). It 
corresponds to the power of the hypothesis testing, and is computed as:  
 
ܴܶܲ௄ ൌ ܲሺܵ ൒ ܭǡ ܤ ൌ ͳሻ ൌ
்௉
்௉ାிே                                                                          (Eqn 11)        
 
A false positive rate (FPR) is the probability of generating false alarms when no crisis 
occurred (P = 1, B = 0). It corresponds to the statistical type II error, which can be 
computed as:                    
 
ܨܴܲ௄ ൌ ܲሺܵ ൒ ܭǡ ܤ ൌ Ͳሻ ൌ
ி௉
ி௉ା்ே                                                                          (Eqn 12) 
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A false negative rate (FNR) is the probability of generating no alarms before an actual 
crisis (P = 0, B = 1). It corresponds to the statistical type I error, which can be 
computed as:  
 
ܨܴܰ௄ ൌ ܲሺܵ ൏ ܭǡ ܤ ൌ ͳሻ ൌ ͳ െ ܴܶܲ௄                                                                   (Eqn 13) 
 
The threshold level is the key to the ROC method. When the threshold k for a given 
indicator is too low11, the indicator issues signals all the time and thereby picks up all 
crises, but at the same time raises numerous false alarms (TPR = 1 and FPR = 1). On 
the other hand, when the threshold is too high12, although a given indicator receives 
no false alarms, it also provides no signals (TPR = 0 and FPR = 0). Any threshold k 
between these two extreme cases corresponds to the trade-off between the TPR and 
the FPR. The ROC curve summarises this trade-off by mapping FPR to TPR for all 
possible thresholds. Therefore, the TPR can be written as a function of FPR as:  
 
 ܴܶܲ ൌ ܴܱܥሺܨܴܲሻ                                                                                                     (Eqn 14) 
 
A signal S is said to be fully informative if there exists a threshold k for S to achieve 
TPRk = 1 and FPRk = 0. In other words, an informative indicator can predict all crises 
but send no false alarms. By contrast, S is fully uninformative if TPRk = 0 and 
FPRk = 1. It means that an indicator can predict no crises but sends false alarms all the 
time.  
                                                             
11For instance, consider an indicator that varies from 0 to ൅λ. If we set the threshold to 0, then every 
signal is above the threshold and the economy is believed to be in a pre-crisis boom. As a result, this 
indicator can capture all the pre-crisis boom periods, but at the cost of missing all the normal periods.   
12For instance, consider an indicator that varies from 0 to െλ. If we set the threshold to 0, then every 
signal is below the threshold and the economy is believed to be in a normal period. As a result, this 
indicator can capture all the normal periods, but at the cost of missing all the pre-crisis periods.   
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The ROC curve can also combine with policymaker risk aversion between type I and 
type II error. Policymakers’ risk aversions are important when determining a suitable 
threshold of the CCB. If the costs and benefits of a macroprudential policy 
intervention can be reasonably estimated, then a certain point on the ROC curve can 
be located that corresponds to a specific threshold which realises the optimal trade-off 
between true and false positives. To take all possible risk aversions into account, 
Drehmann and Juselius (2014) suggest calculating the area under the ROC curve 
(AUC) for all possible thresholds. The AUC summarises the overall performance of a 
given indicator. To be specific, the AUC is interpreted as the likelihood that the 
distribution of S during the boom is stochastically larger than during normal times. A 
high value of the AUC signifies that the indicator consistently provides more precise 
signals, independent from specific thresholds chosen. AUC is given by:  
 
ܣܷܥ௛ሺܵሻ ൌ ׬ ܴܱܥௌ௛
ଵ
଴ ሺݔሻ݀ݔ,                                                                                       (Eqn 15) 
 
where S indicates a signal issued h quarters before a crisis. The value of the AUC 
varies from 0 to 1. For a fully informative indicator, the AUC = 1. For a fully 
uninformative indicator, the AUC = 0.5.  
 
To examine different policymaker risk aversions, Alessi and Detken (2011) define the 
preference weighted sum of the two errors as the loss function (L) of a given indicator:  
 
ܮ ൌ ߠ ൈ ݐ݄݁ݎܽݐ݁݋݂ݐݕ݌݁ܫ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߠሻൈ ݐ݄݁ݐ݄݁ݎܽݐ݁݋݂ݐݕ݌݁ܫܫ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ   (Eqn 16) 
 
where ߠ is the policymaker’s risk aversion parameter between type I and II errors.  
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Alessi and Detken (2011) also define the usefulness of a given indicator as how much 
an indicator can minimise the loss function. The usefulness is then equal to:  
 
ܷݏ݂݁ݑ݈݊݁ݏݏ ൌ ܯ݅݊ሺߠǡ ͳ െ ߠሻ െ ܮ                                                                            (Eqn 17) 
 
To evaluate the performance of different indicators, this research first used the area 
under the ROC curve (AUC) for all possible thresholds to represent the overall 
performance of a given indicator. Then a balanced preference between type I and II 
errors for policymakers’ risk aversion (ȟ  = 0.5) was used to generate optimal 
threshold, TPR, FPR, noise-to-signal ratio and usefulness. In line with Drehmann and 
Juselius’ (2014) and Detken et al.’s (2014) research, this study evaluates the 
performance of each indicator by employing ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ evaluation 
procedures. The static procedure highlights the overall performance of a given 
indicator. It also has the advantage of being able to be conducted both for the pooled 
dataset and on a country-by-country basis. It can thus provide information about the 
number of countries in the European Union for which an indicator provides a 
significant signal. On the other hand, the dynamic evaluation procedure has the 
advantage of highlighting the stability of the signalling performance of an indicator at 
different forecasting horizons. However, the dynamic evaluation procedure can only 
be conducted for the pooled data, as there are not sufficient data points for a country-
by-country analysis.  
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4.3.2 The Build-up Phase 
 
Static evaluation procedure 
 
Given that banks should typically be given one and half years to build up the CCB, 
the ‘static’ period in this study is defined as five years to one and half years prior to a 
crisis (i.e. from 20 quarters to six quarters ahead of a financial crisis: L = [–20, –6]). 
All crises quarters and one to five quarters prior to each crisis are excluded from the 
analysis. To assess the overall performance of an early warning indicator, AUCs are 
estimated over the entire ‘static’ period.  
 
True positive: Each quarter within the L = [–20, –6] period during which a signal was 
issued is counted as a correctly identified pre-crisis quarter, whereas each quarter 
during which no signal was issued is counted as a missed pre-crisis quarter.  
 
True positive rate: Based on true positive, the TPR is calculated on the number of 
correctly identified pre-crisis quarters as a share of the total number of quarters during 
the entire evaluation period.  
 
False positive: The number of false alarms is determined by counting all signals 
issued prior to the five-year period ahead of a crisis and all signals issued after the end 
of a crisis.  
 
False positive rate: Based on false positive, the FPR is calculated as the number of 
false alarms as a share of the total number of quarters outside the evaluation and 
crises periods. 
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Dynamic evaluation procedure 
 
The difference between static and dynamic evaluation procedures is the testing period. 
For example, the dynamic evaluation procedure can test pre-boom periods like [–20, –
9]. The purpose of the dynamic evaluation procedure is to assess the appropriate 
timing of a given indicator. In practice, the dynamic approach differs from the static 
procedure in terms of how the TPR is computed; it is calculated for each single 
evaluation horizon h within the evaluation horizon (i.e. h = 20, 19, 18 , … , 6). For 
example, at horizon [–20, –16], which is four years ahead of a crisis, a signal is only 
recorded as a true positive if it is issued 16 quarters ahead of the beginning of a crisis. 
The FPR, on the other hand, is determined as for the static evaluation procedure.  
 
4.3.3 The Release Phase 
 
Following the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s guidance, Jahn (2014) 
considers two scenarios: a prompt release in times of financial stress and a release 
when systemic-wide financial stability risks recede. To reflect the fact that the release 
phase requires a near-coincident rather than a leading indicator of financial stress, the 
evaluation is based on a short-term prediction horizon rather than the longer 
evaluation horizon used for the build-up phase. However, there is no standard static 
period for the release phase. Detken et al. (2014) suggest a period of [–2, 0]. On the 
other hand, Drehmann et al. (2010, 2011) suggest using [–1] as a release phase period 
to reflect the coincident, but not as a leading indicator of distress. As the ROC 
analysis is used to assess the early warning indicators during a pre-crisis period, 
normal periods [–2, 0] were adopted as testing periods for the release phase in this 
study. Moreover, only the static procedure for the release phase was tested, as the 
period is very short.   
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4.3.4 Criteria for Indicator Selection 
 
To assess the performance of market illiquidity and the credit-to-GDP ratio gap, this 
study applied the following five criteria proposed by Detken et al. (2014) and 
Drehmann and Juselius (2014): 
(1) Overall performance – for the build-up and release phase, any indicator with an 
AUC smaller than 0.6 is not recommended. This criterion reflects that the overall 
performance of a given indicator should be better than a random coin toss13.  
(2) True positive and false positive rates – any indicator with a TPR of less than two-
thirds and/or a FPR of more than one-third for balanced policymakers’ risk aversion 
preferences (ߠ ൌ ͲǤͷሻ is not recommended14. In other words, the noise-to-signal ratio 
of a well-performing indicator should be less than 0.5.  
(3) Performance across member states – any indicator for which the AUC is 
insignificant for more than one-third of the sample is not recommended. The cut-off 
level of one-third reflects the aim of identifying indicators that prove to be useful 
across the sample. Indicators eliminated by this criterion may nevertheless provide 
useful signals in individual countries.  
(4) Usefulness – any indicator with a usefulness measure of less than 0.1 for balanced 
policymakers’ risk aversion preferences is not recommended. A model is considered 
useful if the loss arising from the policymakers’ loss function is smaller than the loss 
obtained when disregarding the model. Alessi and Detken (2011) show that a cut-off 
of 0.1 represents that using the indicator can improve forecast ability by 20%.  
(5) Stability – based on the dynamic evaluation procedure, indicators are not 
recommended if they exhibit two successive quarters with an AUC not significantly 
above 0.5. This is because when an indicator breaches a threshold and signals a crisis, 
                                                             
13The toss of a coin would have a value of 0.5, for an indicator to be considered as performing well, it 
would need to be somewhat better than a coin toss.  
14Detken et al. (2014) set the TPR and FPR at 0.5, which is a looser criterion than this study.   
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policymakers are unable to tell whether this signal indicates a crisis in, for example, 
20 or in four quarters. Without this information indicators that display good signalling 
properties on many horizons, but perform poorly over a prolonged window within the 
evaluation horizon have limited usefulness in a univariate analysis.  
 
4.4 Data Description 
 
4.4.1 Inputs 
 
This chapter requires high frequent market data. Data availability differs from 
Datastream to World Bank database. In addition, Hodrick-Prescott trend requires at 
lease 5 years data to generate a meaningful trend. Due to these two reasons, this 
chapter includes quarterly time-series data of 16 European countries15 and the US. As 
demonstrated in Table 10, the sample used in this study starts from 1976 for France, 
Germany, the UK, the US, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Austria and Denmark, and at 
the earliest available date for the other countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Belgium). It ends in 2013Q4.  
 
Stock market index prices and risk-free rates were collected from Datastream16. The 
measure of total credit to the private non-financial sector was obtained from the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) database (Dembiermont et al., 2013). The BIS 
database contains more sources of credit to the private sector than the International 
Financial Statistics (IMF-IFS) does. The IMF-IFS database can be misleading as it 
excludes important sources of credit, such as bond markets or cross-border loans. 
Dembiermont et al. (2013) show that across countries and time, banks provide on 
average 70% of credit to the private non-financial sector. For example, in the US, 
                                                             
15France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Norway, Belgium and Denmark.  
16Volatility is annualised through daily stock market index returns.  
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banks provided more than 50% of credit in the 1950s, but they extend just above 30% 
currently. By using the BIS database, this study could test whether the cross-border 
source of credit can improve the performance of the credit-to-GDP ratio. However, 
the credit-to-GDP ratio still cannot take the dynamics and interactions between 
domestic and cross-border credit into account.  
 
4.4.2 Hodrick - Prescott Trend 
 
Consistent with chapter 3, market illiquidity and the credit-to-GDP ratio are expressed 
as deviations from their long-term trends. This study generates gaps by subtracting a 
one-sided Hodrick–Prescott filtered trend from the level of series. It is equal to the 
difference between current value and the long-term trend of a given indicator. To 
ensure that trends are stable enough, the method requires at least 10 years’ worth of 
data. In addition, the calculation of the Hodrick–Prescott filter involves a key 
smoothing parameter (O). It has become standard to set lambda to 1600 for quarterly 
data. However, Ravn and Uhlig (2002) show that for series of other frequencies (daily 
and annual) it is optimal to set lambda equal to 1600 multiplied by the fourth power 
of the observation frequency ratio. To imply that the financial cycles are four times 
longer than standard business cycles, the lambda is set to 400 000 for the credit-to-
GDP ratio (Drehmann et al., 2011). Due to this reason, this chapter follows Drehmann 
et al. (2011) by setting the smoothing parameter to 400 000 for de-trending market 
illiquidity and the credit-to-GDP ratio. 
 
4.4.3 Dating Crises 
 
Methodologies based on the main theories can explain various types of crises; 
however, these theories are not straightforward in practice. As a result, the dating of 
banking crises is typically based on different researchers’ judgmental analyses of a 
combination of events such as: forced closures, mergers or government takeovers of 
financial institutions; runs on several banks; or the extension of government 
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assistance to one or more financial institutions. For instance, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009) date the beginning of banking crises through two types of event: bank runs that 
lead to the closure of, merging or takeover by the public sector of one or more 
financial institutions; or if there are no runs, they check the closure of, merging of, 
takeover of or large-scale public assistance to an important financial institution. As 
Reinhart and Rogoff acknowledge, this approach has some obvious drawbacks. For 
example, it could date crises too late (or too early) and provides information only 
about the end date of these episodes. Anther important study in this field is from 
Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2010). Although there are overlaps between Laeven and 
Valencia (2008, 2010) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), differences remain in the 
dating of crises, which can affect analyses. One such difference is the commencement 
date of Japan’s banking crisis, which is dated by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) as 1992 
and as 1997 by Laeven and Valencia (2008).  
 
Identifying the commencement date of the GFC is critical in this research, because 
most of the data cover this period. There are two key stages during the 
commencement of the 2007–09 GFC: the third quarter of 2007 (Q3) and the third 
quarter of 2008 (Q3). Stage one began with the seizure in the banking system 
precipitated by BNP Paribas announcing that it was ceasing activity in three hedge 
funds that specialised in US mortgage debt. This was the moment concerns were 
raised that there were tens of trillions of dollars’ worth of derivatives swilling round 
worth a lot less than bankers had previously imagined. The contingent liability was so 
big that no one knew how big the losses were or how great the exposure of individual 
banks actually was, so uncertainty increased overnight. However, there was no solid 
evidence that the economy was going to collapse at the same time. Under this 
situation, a sudden announcement to release the CCB could destroy investors’ 
confidence by letting investors believe that banks are running out of capital.  
 
It took a year for the financial crisis to reach its second stage. On 15 September 2008, 
the US Government allowed the investment bank Lehman Brothers to go bankrupt. 
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Up to this point, it had been assumed that governments would always step in to bail 
out any bank that experienced serious trouble; for example, the US had previously 
done so by finding a buyer for Bear Stearns while the UK had nationalised Northern 
Rock. When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, the notion that all banks were ‘too-big-
to-fail’ no longer held true. As a result, every bank was deemed to be risky. The 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers triggered the GFC as it had counterparties across the 
globe. European financial institutions, in both their US and their European activities, 
fully shared the same misbehaviour of US banking institutions. Inside the euro zone, 
Ireland and Spain had experienced huge housing bubbles and associated credit booms. 
Within a month, the threat of a domino effect throughout the global financial system 
forced western governments to inject vast sums of capital into their banks to prevent 
their collapse. Credit flows to the private sector were choked off at the same time as 
consumer and business confidence collapsed.  
 
Given that the purpose of the countercyclical capital buffer is to mitigate a collective 
contraction in the supply of lending to households and businesses that could weaken 
growth and undermine resilience, it is important to examine the behaviour of the real 
economy during the GFC. Chor and Manova (2012) documented that the real 
economy was in fact recording modest trend growth until 2008Q3. The US trade 
flows witnessed a particularly sharp decline between October and November 2008, 
which coincided with the height of the global credit crunch. Although nervousness 
over the exposure of financial institutions to the subprime mortgage market had been 
building since the end of 2007, two events in September 2008 – the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers and the government bailout of American International Group (AIG) 
– brought credit activity to a virtual standstill and raised the prospect of a financial 
sector meltdown in the US. Moreover, the Dow Jones industrial average index 
subsequently plunged almost 20% during a single week in mid-October 2008, 
dragging down investor and consumer sentiment substantially. So far, there is enough 
evidence for the hypothetical release of CCB. Due to these reasons, this study uses 
2008Q3 as the crisis date for the US and UK instead of 2007Q3.  
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Most of the countries in the sample started experiencing the GFC in 2008Q3. In 
addition, this study’s sample also covers four other banking crises, including France 
1994Q1; Italy 1992Q3; UK 1990Q3 and US 1988Q1, making 17 banking crises in 
total. Although other studies argue that financial market indicators include short time 
series data and cover only recent crises, this research provides a more comprehensive 
cross-border and time analysis of market illiquidity. 
 
Table 9. Data availability 
The sample period and crises dates of 16 European countries and the US.  
Country Market illiquidity Credit-to-GDP ratio Crisis date 
Start End Start End  
Austria 1976Q2 2013Q4 1988Q4 2013Q4 2008Q3 
Belgium 1989Q4 2013Q4 1980Q4 2013Q4 2008Q3 
Denmark 1976Q2 2012Q2 1980Q4 2013Q4 1987Q1; 2008Q3 
France 1976Q2 2013Q4 1978Q1 2013Q4 1994Q1; 2008Q3 
Finland 1987Q2 2013Q4 1976Q2 2013Q4 1991Q3 
Germany 1976Q2 2013Q4 1976Q2 2013Q4 2008Q3 
Greece 1994Q2 2013Q4 1995Q1 2011Q1 2008Q3 
Ireland 1985Q1 2013Q4 1976Q1 2013Q4 2008Q3 
Italy 1978Q3 2013Q4 1980Q4 2013Q4 1992Q3; 2008Q3 
Norway 1986Q1 2013Q4 1978Q4 2013Q4 1990Q3 
Netherlands 1976Q2 2013Q4 1977Q4 2013Q4 2008Q3 
Portugal 1996Q2 2013Q4 1995Q4 2013Q3 2008Q3 
Spain 1989Q2 2013Q4 1989Q4 2013Q4 2008Q3 
Sweden 1989Q3 2013Q4 1989Q4 2013Q4 2008Q3 
Switzerland 1976Q2 2013Q1 1980Q4 2013Q3 2008Q3 
UK 1976Q2 2013Q4 1976Q2 2013Q3 1990Q3; 2008Q3 
US 1976Q2 2013Q4 1976Q2 2013Q4 1988Q1; 2008Q3 
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4.5 Empirical Results 
 
4.5.1 Summary Statistics   
 
Table 10 provides summary statistics of market illiquidity and the credit-to-GDP ratio 
of the 17 countries in the sample. The average credit-to-GDP ratio is positive for 
every sample country over its sample period. Moreover, the sample countries exhibit 
a large variability and volatility. On one hand, the US has the lowest average credit-
to-GDP ratio of 31.44% while on the other hand, Denmark has the highest average 
credit-to-GDP ratio of 189.95%. Ireland has the most volatile credit-to-GDP ratio 
with the standard deviation of 83.68% while the US has the most stable credit-to-GDP 
ratio with the standard deviation of 5.36%. These preliminary statistics suggest that 
Ireland and Denmark are likely to accumulate more capital buffer more often than 
other sample countries according to the CCB regulatory scheme.  
 
As an alternative indicator to trigger capital buffer, Table 10 shows that the average 
market illiquidity varies from 5.40% in the US to 13.16% in Greece. In terms of the 
median market illiquidity, the highest median of 12.62% is in Greece compared to the 
lowest median of 3.35% in Austria. It is interesting to point out that Greece, which 
experienced much financial distress and many bailouts in the recent crisis, also has 
higher market illiquidity than other sample countries. These preliminary results are 
consistent with the argument that market illiquidity may provide information when 
systemic risk is materialised. In addition, US stock market is more liquid than 
European stock markets. With in Europe, Switzerland has the most liquid stock 
market.  
 
The correlation between market illiquidity and the credit-to-GDP ratio is reported in 
Table 11. If the increase of credit-to-GDP ratio can reduce market illiquidity, then the 
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two variables should have a negative correlation. However, results in Table 11 show 
that only Austria, Germany and Finland have negative correlations between market 
illiquidity and the credit-to-GDP ratio. Finland records the lowest correlation of –0.12. 
The correlations between market illiquidity and the credit-to-GDP ratio are positive 
for the rest of the 14 countries. Norway has the highest correlation of 0.40. The 
correlation results imply that the credit-to-GDP ratio and market illiquidity do not 
move together. Given that credit-to-GDP is procyclical (see results in chapter 3), the 
lack of correlation implies that market illiquidity is countercyclical in most of the 
countries.
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Table 10. Summary statistics of market illiquidity (ILO) and the credit-to-GDP ratio (C/GDP) of 17 countries 
This table presents summary statistics of market illiquidity and credit-to-GDP ratio of 17 countries, including France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Switzerland, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Norway, Belgium and Denmark. The mean, median, 
maximum, minimum, and Std.Dev. are presented in percentage points.   
Country Mean (%) Median (%) Maximum (%) Minimum (%) SD (%) Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Probability 
ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP  ILO C/GDP 
Austria 6.01 120.59 3.35 1.25 85.65 1.53 0.17 0.88 8.90 19.50 5.38 0.06 44.55 1.64 11590.02 7.86 0.00 0.02 
Belgium 7.20 127.52 4.97 1.12 34.33 2.06 2.01 0.76 5.72 44.46 2.14 0.43 8.33 1.70 188.80 13.40 0.00 0.00 
Denmark 7.11 189.95 4.73 1.72 30.08 2.67 1.84 1.39 5.46 45.27 1.90 0.48 6.49 1.56 160.67 11.50 0.00 0.00 
France 7.01 132.87 5.07 1.31 29.87 1.81 1.59 0.89 5.65 23.98 2.01 0.22 7.02 2.55 203.17 2.30 0.00 0.32 
Finland 7.73 118.55 3.90 1.18 51.08 1.81 0.06 0.61 10.74 35.94 2.48 0.19 9.15 1.84 278.08 9.34 0.00 0.01 
Germany 7.22 126.08 5.24 1.26 31.91 1.52 1.92 1.08 5.69 9.94 2.13 –0.01 7.87 2.04 263.78 5.79 0.00 0.06 
Greece 13.16 81.75 12.62 0.75 43.84 1.36 3.15 0.36 8.45 34.91 1.17 0.20 4.42 1.58 30.87 6.56 0.00 0.04 
Ireland 8.31 133.84 5.90 0.88 41.27 3.33 1.77 0.68 7.21 83.68 2.34 1.37 9.36 3.40 301.52 48.09 0.00 0.00 
Italy 9.43 83.67 7.16 0.74 30.59 1.30 2.23 0.54 6.47 25.01 1.32 0.73 4.21 2.12 49.71 16.10 0.00 0.00 
Norway 9.54 155.99 7.18 1.53 41.34 2.30 2.44 1.01 7.25 33.39 2.39 0.33 9.73 2.51 318.00 4.00 0.00 0.14 
Netherlands 6.68 191.93 3.92 1.70 47.75 2.66 0.88 1.20 7.80 46.79 3.07 0.30 13.21 1.50 891.81 15.91 0.00 0.00 
Portugal 8.30 175.03 5.85 1.87 29.12 2.34 1.74 0.92 6.39 45.39 1.32 –0.35 3.89 1.80 29.24 5.79 0.00 0.06 
Spain 8.08 122.97 6.23 0.93 28.96 2.26 2.69 0.59 5.62 55.94 1.68 0.72 5.62 1.94 74.87 17.70 0.00 0.00 
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Sweden 10.02 155.57 7.72 1.44 33.32 2.60 2.73 0.89 7.16 47.22 1.58 0.81 5.06 2.68 57.98 15.01 0.00 0.00 
Switzerland 5.71 176.50 3.43 1.82 55.57 2.19 0.80 1.28 7.32 21.38 4.01 –0.46 22.72 2.71 2795.03 5.14 0.00 0.08 
UK 6.73 125.04 5.20 1.273 29.16 2.15 1.72 0.41 4.70 48.53 1.88 –0.13 6.95 1.86 186.83 8.57 0.00 0.01 
US 5.40 31.44 4.09 0.30 23.97 0.42 1.69 0.23 4.15 5.36 2.12 0.32 7.78 2.04 257.54 8.47 0.00 0.01 
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Figure 3 demonstrates that the market illiquidity gap and the credit-to-GDP gap 
behave differently for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, which experienced 
more financial distress than other European counterparts during the GFC. For those 
five countries, the credit-to-GDP ratio tended to increase ahead of the GFC. At the 
same time, market illiquidity stayed below its long-term trend. This implies that 
during credit growth periods, the credit-to-GDP ratio increases and the market is more 
liquid than in normal times. However, at the height and in the aftermath of the GFC, 
the credit-to-GDP gap was still well above 10% for the five countries, and thereby 
would fail to trigger a release of capital buffer during the crisis. By contrast, the 
market illiquidity gap increased sharply into the positive just before or at the 
beginning of the GFC, which would have hypothetically allowed a quick release of 
the CCB to absorb potential bank losses. In the other sample countries, overall, the 
behaviour of the two indicators was similar around the time of the GFC. It appears 
that the credit-to-GDP gap and market illiquidity gap are both useful indicators in 
accumulating capital buffer during good times, but only market illiquidity is useful in 
the buffer release phase.  
 
The two indicators behave differently not only in troubled countries but also in the 
strongest members of the EU. Figure 3 shows that Germany’s credit-to-GDP gap 
peaked 10 quarters ahead of the GFC. The gap is less than its long-term trend at least 
one year ahead of the GFC. It means that the credit-to-GDP gap led to a release of the 
CCB too early prior to the GFC. It also implies that in Germany there was no 
domestic cause of a financial imbalance build-up ahead of the GFC. On the other 
hand, as shown in Figure 3, the market illiquidity gap was below its long-term trend 
ahead of the 2008 crisis and rose sharply when the crisis happened. It shows that the 
market illiquidity gap sent timely signals for financial stress when there was no sign 
of a domestic credit boom in Germany. It also implies that the market illiquidity gap 
has the ability to capture systemic risks outside a given country.  
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Table 11. Pair-wise correlation between market illiquidity and credit-to-GDP ratio in each 
sample country 
Country Correlation 
Austria –0.11 
Belgium 0.30 
Denmark 0.34 
France 0.07 
Finland –0.12 
Germany –0.01 
Greece 0.38 
Ireland 0.27 
Italy 0.16 
Norway 0.40 
Netherlands 0.22 
Portugal 0.27 
Spain 0.19 
Sweden 0.14 
Switzerland 0.11 
UK 0.07 
US 0.26 
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Figure 3. The behaviour of market illiquidity and credit-to-GDP ratio gaps around the financial crisis period in six countries. The period includes three 
different sub-periods: pre-crisis [–10, 1], crisis [0] and post-crisis [1, 10]. The market liquidity and credit-to-GDP ratio gaps are presented as percentages. 
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4.5.2 Receiver Operating Characteristic Results  
 
Build-up phase  
Following the preliminary analysis in this study, the ROC method was applied to 
assess the performance of the credit-to-GDP ratio gap and the market illiquidity gap 
based on the five criteria described in section 4.3. Results in Table 12 show that 
market illiquidity satisfies all five criteria: (1) overall performance; (2) performance 
across member states; (3) stability; (4) true positive and false positive rates; and (5) 
usefulness. By contrast, the credit-to-GDP ratio gap only satisfies the ‘stability’ and 
‘usefulness’ criteria and fails the other three criteria. For static analysis, the overall 
performance of market illiquidity and credit-to-GDP gaps is 0.75 and 0.59 
respectively. It is clear that the market illiquidity gap not only satisfies criteria 1 but 
also outperforms the credit-to-GDP gap by 0.16. In addition, the market illiquidity 
gap outperforms the credit-to-GDP ratio gap by achieving higher usefulness, lower 
type II errors and a lower noise-to-signal ratio at the optional threshold. The TPR of 
the market illiquidity gap and the credit-to-GDP gap is 0.71 and 0.51 respectively. 
The credit-to-GDP ratio gap fails to meet at least two-thirds of the TPR criteria.  
 
Table 12 also shows the dynamic evaluation procedure results. The results are based 
on pooled data for each evaluation horizon up to 20 quarters ahead of a crisis. Results 
in the AUCs increase when crisis nears for both indicators and both indicators satisfy 
the stability criteria. However, the AUCs of the market illiquidity gap are larger than 
that of the credit-to-GDP gap across all forecasting horizons. In other words, 
regardless of which forecasting horizon is chosen, the market illiquidity gap always 
outperforms the credit-to-GDP gap in generating larger AUCs. More specifically, the 
AUCs of the market illiquidity range from 0.59 at [–20] horizon to 0.77 at [–20, –10] 
horizon compared with those of the credit-to-GDP ratio gap ranging from 0.54 at [–20] 
to 0.59 at [–6, –20] respectively.  
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Table 12. Build-up phase (pooled sample) 
The performance of the market illiquidity gap (ILO) and the credit-to-GDP ratio gap (C/GDP) during the CCB build-up phase from a pooled sample. AUC is 
the area under the ROC curve; it measures the overall performance of a given indicator. The optimal threshold, the true positive rate (TPR), the false positive 
rate (FPR), the loss function, the noise-to-signal ratio (NS ratio) and usefulness are generated from a balanced policymakers’ preference.  
Horizon AUC Optimal 
threshold 
TPR (ȟ = 0.5) FPR (ȟ = 0.5) Loss function NS ratio Non-crisis 
observation 
Crisis 
observation 
Usefulness 
ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP 
[–6, –20] 0.75 0.59 –3.16 –0.49 0.71 0.51 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.41 0.45 0.63 736 763 280 275 0.20 0.09 
[–7, –20] 0.75 0.59 –3.16 –0.49 0.71 0.50 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.41 0.45 0.64 736 763 260 253 0.19 0.09 
[–8, –20] 0.74 0.58 –3.16 –0.49 0.69 0.49 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.42 0.46 0.65 736 763 240 232 0.19 0.08 
[–9, –20] 0.74 0.58 –3.16 –0.49 0.68 0.48 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.42 0.46 0.67 736 763 221 213 0.18 0.08 
[–10, –20] 0.77 0.57 –3.16 –0.49 0.73 0.47 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.42 0.43 0.68 736 763 202 195 0.21 0.08 
[–11, –20] 0.76 0.57 –3.16 0.14 0.72 0.44 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.43 0.44 0.66 736 763 183 177 0.20 0.07 
[–12, –20] 0.74 0.56 –3.16 –7.95 0.70 0.81 0.32 0.67 0.31 0.43 0.45 0.82 736 763 164 159 0.19 0.07 
[–13, –20] 0.73 0.55 –3.16 –7.95 0.67 0.81 0.32 0.67 0.32 0.43 0.47 0.82 736 763 145 141 0.18 0.07 
[–14, –20] 0.72 0.54 –3.16 –7.95 0.66 0.80 0.32 0.67 0.33 0.44 0.48 0.84 736 763 126 123 0.17 0.07 
[–15, –20] 0.73 0.54 –3.16 0.01 0.67 0.41 0.32 0.29 0.32 0.44 0.47 0.72 736 763 107 105 0.18 0.06 
[–16, –20] 0.70 0.55 –3.16 0.01 0.63 0.43 0.32 0.29 0.35 0.43 0.50 0.69 736 763 88 87 0.16 0.07 
[–17, –20] 0.66 0.55 –0.60 0.14 0.87 0.42 0.62 0.29 0.38 0.43 0.72 0.68 736 763 69 69 0.12 0.07 
[–18, –20] 0.61 0.55 0.41 6.40 0.92 0.26 0.69 0.13 0.38 0.44 0.75 0.49 736 763 51 51 0.12 0.07 
[–19, –20] 0.66 0.54 –0.79 –10.08 0.88 0.88 0.61 0.77 0.37 0.44 0.69 0.87 736 763 34 34 0.14 0.06 
[–20] 0.59 0.54 2.39 –9.59 1.00 0.88 0.78 0.74 0.39 0.43 0.78 0.84 736 763 17 17 0.11 0.07 
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Table 13 shows the performance of the market illiquidity gap and the credit-to-GDP 
ratio gap for each country in the sample. In relation to AUC, the market illiquidity gap 
outperforms the credit-to-GDP ratio gap in France, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium. Conversely, the credit-
to-GDP ratio gap outperforms the market illiquidity gap in Germany, Italy, the UK, 
the US and Denmark. In addition, the AUC performances of the two indicators are 
quite similar in Germany, Spain and the Netherlands. It is interesting to note that 
market illiquidity is a better indicator to signal build-up of financial imbalance in 
most of the European countries that have adopted the euro as their official currency. 
For countries such as Switzerland, which practises strict financial discipline, and 
Sweden, which uses its own currency instead of the euro, the credit-to-GDP ratio gap 
is almost useless. It implies that market illiquidity can be a useful indicator when 
identifying the build-up of financial imbalance in those countries that do not have a 
domestic credit boom.  
 
In summary, market illiquidity is satisfactory for all assessing criteria, it outperforms 
the credit-to-GDP ratio gap by generating higher overall performance, TPR and 
usefulness, and lower FPR and noise-to-signal ratio. It also performs better than the 
credit-to-GDP ratio gap in most of the sample countries. Given that the credit-to-GDP 
ratio gap is an official standard guiding indicator for implementing CCB, market 
illiquidity should play an important role in making CCB build-up decisions.
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Table 13. Build-up phase (individual countries) 
The performance of the market illiquidity gap (ILO) and credit-to-GDP ratio gap (C/GDP) during the CCB release phase from individual countries. AUC is 
the area under the ROC curve; it measures the overall performance of a given indicator. The optimal threshold, the true positive rate (TPR), the false positive 
rate (FPR), the loss function, the noise-to-signal ratio (NS ratio) and usefulness are generated from a balanced policymakers’ preference.  
Horizon AUC Optimal threshold TPR (ȟ = 0.5) FPR (ȟ = 0.5) Loss function NS ratio Usefulness 
ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP 
Austria 0.59 0.24 –3.25 –3.16 0.80 0.93 0.45 0.90 0.33 0.48 0.56 0.96 0.18 0.02 
Belgium 0.84 0.59 –3.60 –7.62 0.67 0.93 0.07 0.63 0.20 0.35 0.10 0.67 0.30 0.15 
Denmark 0.83 0.90 –3.16 –13.17 0.80 0.87 0.17 0.09 0.19 0.11 0.21 0.11 0.32 0.39 
France 0.76 0.69 –2.39 7.33 0.63 0.47 0.17 0.00 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.00 0.23 0.23 
Finland# NA 0.45 NA –9.00 NA 0.87 NA 0.65 NA 0.39 NA 0.75 NA 0.11 
Germany 0.82 0.83 –3.81 1.99 0.73 1.00 0.12 0.28 0.19 0.14 0.16 0.28 0.31 0.36 
Greece 0.92 0.28 –3.50 –1.19 0.87 0.07 0.18 0.00 0.16 0.47 0.20 0.00 0.35 0.03 
Ireland 0.75 0.18 –5.47 –41.44 0.53 1.00 0.06 1.00 0.26 0.50 0.11 1.00 0.24 0.00 
Italy 0.79 0.96 –4.96 –4.52 0.58 0.88 0.03 0.07 0.23 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.27 0.41 
Norway# NA 0.95 NA 22.47 NA 1.00 NA 0.05 NA 0.03 NA 0.05 NA 0.48 
Netherlands 0.84 0.81 –4.71 4.32 0.73 1.00 0.06 0.22 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.22 0.34 0.39 
Portugal 0.90 0.56 –4.79 6.15 0.73 0.53 0.00 0.18 0.13 0.32 0.00 0.34 0.37 0.18 
Spain 0.97 0.92 –2.76 –7.20 0.93 0.93 0.00 0.24 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.25 0.47 0.35 
Sweden 0.98 0.01 –1.21 –37.92 1.00 1.00 0.13 1.00 0.06 0.50 0.13 1.00 0.44 0.00 
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Switzerland 0.75 0.05 –4.38 –17.07 0.47 1.00 0.06 1.00 0.30 0.50 0.12 1.00 0.20 0.00 
UK 0.61 0.79 –4.03 3.33 0.30 0.59 0.03 0.08 0.37 0.24 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.26 
US 0.78 0.97 –3.29 0.10 0.53 1.00 0.06 0.08 0.27 0.04 0.12 0.08 0.23 0.46 
#The sample of market liquidity for Finland and Norway is not over a long enough period to include a financial crisis. 
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Release phase 
Table 14 reports the performance of market illiquidity and credit-to-GDP ratio gaps 
during the CCB release phase. The signalling approach used in the analysis 
corresponds to the static procedure described in section 4.3. All signals issued over 
the indicated period were evaluated against the occurrence of a banking crisis to 
assess the signalling abilities of the indicators. The results demonstrate that market 
illiquidity satisfies all five critical criteria, while the credit-to-GDP ratio gap fails all 
five criteria. More specifically, the overall performance, noise-to-signal ratio and the 
usefulness of the market illiquidity gap are 0.79, 0.26 and 0.27 respectively, compared 
with those of the credit-to-GDP ratio gap which are 0.23, 1.00 and 0.000 respectively. 
In addition, market illiquidity predicts 71.4% (TPR) of the financial crises while only 
generating 18.2% false alarms (FPR) at its optimal threshold. This performance is 
superior as the credit-to-GDP ratio gap predicts 100% of crises with the cost of 99.9% 
false alarms at its optimal threshold.  
 
The performance of the market illiquidity gap improves when the prediction horizon 
narrows. The AUCs, TPR, noise-to-signal ratio and usefulness of using a [–1, 0] 
horizon are 0.86, 85.7%, 0.24 and 0.33. These results confirm the near-coincident 
property of the market illiquidity gap. The closer the crisis, the more accurate the 
warning from the market illiquidity gap becomes. Consistent with the results of a [–2, 
0] horizon, the credit-to-GDP ratio gap does not have a near-coincident property as 
the AUC of using a [–1, 0] horizon is still smaller than 0.5. Detken et al. (2014) found 
that a LIBOR-OIS spread performs well as a near-coincident indicator. However, a 
LIBOR-OIS spread only has short time series availability for many financial market 
series. This implies that the results from Detken et al. (2014) are drawn from the GFC 
only, so the robustness of their results can be questioned. By contrast, the results in 
the present study are generated from a much longer data period, which covers not 
only the GFC but earlier financial crises as well.  
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The AUC results from individual countries demonstrate similar conclusions to the 
pooled sample. In Table 15, the AUCs of the market illiquidity gap range from 0.69 
for Denmark to 0.94 for the Netherlands. None of the individual countries had an 
AUC less than two-thirds. By contrast, the AUC of the credit-to-GDP ratio gap 
ranged from 0.00 for Ireland and Greece to 0.76 for Switzerland. In other words, by 
using the credit-to-GDP ratio as a CCB release phase indicator, only one out of 17 
countries had an AUC larger than two-thirds. However, the market illiquidity gap still 
performed better than the credit-to-GDP ratio gap in Switzerland by generating larger 
AUCs and usefulness, and lower type II errors and noise-to-signal ratio. Regardless of 
which country was chosen, the market illiquidity gap always outperformed the credit-
to-GDP ratio gap as a better CCB release phase indicator. It is important to mention 
that the market illiquidity gaps of Finland and Norway were still negative during the 
GFC period when other countries’ market illiquidity increased sharply into positive 
territory. This demonstrates the accuracy of using market liquidity as a CCB release 
phase indicator. Market illiquidity gaps increased only in those countries that 
experienced financial crisis. For countries such as Finland and Norway that do not 
have a systemic banking crisis, the market illiquidity gap remained at a normal level.  
 
In summary, market illiquidity is satisfactory for all assessing criteria, it outperforms 
the credit-to-GDP ratio gap by generating higher overall performance, TPR and 
usefulness, and lower FPR and noise-to-signal ratio. It also performs better than the 
credit-to-GDP ratio gap in most of the sample countries. Given the fact that the credit-
to-GDP ratio gap is an official standard guiding indicator for implementing CCB, the 
market illiquidity should play an important role in making CCB build-up decisions. 
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Table 14. Release phase (pooled sample) 
The performance of the market illiquidity gap (ILO) and credit-to-GDP ratio gap (C/GDP) during the CCB release phase from a pooled sample. AUC is the 
area under the ROC curve; it measures the overall performance of a given indicator. The optimal threshold, the true positive rate (TPR), the false positive rate 
(FPR), the loss function, the noise-to-signal ratio (NS ratio) and usefulness are generated from a balanced policymakers’ preference.  
Horizon AUC Optimal 
threshold 
TPR (θ = 0.5) FPR (θ = 0.5) Loss function NS ratio Non-crisis 
observation 
Crisis 
observation 
Usefulness 
ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP 
T = [–2, 
0] 
0.79 0.23 2.00 55.14 0.71 1.00 0.18 1.00 0.23 0.50 0.26 1.00 1077 1104 63 66 0.27 0.00 
T = [–1, 
0] 
0.86 0.22 1.43 47.51 0.86 1.00 0.21 1.00 0.18 0.50 0.24 1.00 1098 1126 42 44 0.33 0.00 
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Table 15. Release phase (individual countries) 
The performance of the market illiquidity gap (ILO) and credit-to-GDP ratio gap (C/GDP) during the CCB release phase from individual countries. AUC is 
the area under the ROC curve; it measures the overall performance of a given indicator. The optimal threshold, the true positive rate (TPR), the false positive 
rate (FPR), the loss function, the noise-to-signal ratio (NS ratio) and usefulness are generated from a balanced policymakers’ preference.  
Horizon AUC Optimal threshold TPR (θ = 0.5) FPR (θ = 0.5) Loss function NS ratio Usefulness 
ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP 
Austria 0.93 0.30 6.75 3.50 1.00 1.00 0.14 0.87 0.07 0.43 0.14 0.87 0.43 0.07 
Belgium 0.80 0.14 11.53 16.34 0.75 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.14 0.50 0.04 1.00 0.36 0.00 
Denmark 0.69 0.02 –1.58 18.14 0.75 1.00 0.32 1.00 0.29 0.50 0.43 1.00 0.22 0.00 
France 0.75 0.34 3.44 7.02 0.75 1.00 0.14 0.72 0.19 0.36 0.19 0.72 0.31 0.14 
Finland# NA 0.18 NA 10.93 NA 1.00 NA 0.93 NA 0.46 NA 0.93 NA 0.04 
Germany 0.84 0.49 –0.72 –0.37 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.53 0.17 0.26 0.33 0.53 0.33 0.24 
Greece 0.83 0.00 –2.05 7.20 1.00 1.00 0.40 1.00 0.20 0.50 0.40 1.00 0.30 0.00 
Ireland 0.84 0.00 9.91 37.97 0.75 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.14 0.50 0.05 1.00 0.36 0.00 
Italy 0.87 0.02 –3.04 11.19 1.00 1.00 0.37 1.00 0.18 0.50 0.37 1.00 0.32 0.00 
Norway# NA 0.15 NA 17.98 NA 1.00 NA 0.88 NA 0.44 NA 0.88 NA 0.06 
Netherlands 0.94 0.55 4.08 1.95 1.00 1.00 0.10 0.58 0.05 0.29 0.10 0.58 0.45 0.21 
Portugal 0.94 0.40 2.58 6.32 1.00 1.00 0.07 0.66 0.04 0.33 0.07 0.66 0.46 0.17 
Spain 0.74 0.04 1.33 26.51 0.75 1.00 0.20 0.96 0.23 0.48 0.27 0.96 0.28 0.02 
Sweden 0.77 0.30 7.60 7.68 0.75 1.00 0.12 0.86 0.18 0.43 0.16 0.86 0.32 0.07 
Switzerland 0.91 0.76 3.37 –2.94 1.00 1.00 0.12 0.35 0.06 0.17 0.12 0.35 0.44 0.33 
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UK 0.82 0.37 2.09 –10.22 0.75 0.25 0.11 0.04 0.18 0.40 0.15 0.17 0.32 0.10 
US 0.89 0.04 0.48 4.76 1.00 1.00 0.21 1.00 0.10 0.50 0.21 1.00 0.40 0.00 
#The sample of market liquidity for Finland and Norway is not over a long enough period to include a financial crisis.
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4.5.3 The Preference of the Policymaker 
 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and the literature following their seminal contribution, 
assess the usefulness of an indicator by computing the noise-to-signal ratio. A useful 
indicator is supposed to have a noise-to-signal ratio of less than 1. The criterion of a 
noise-to-signal ratio less than 1, though, is only a necessary condition for an 
indicator’s usefulness in practice, as: (i) the resulting type I and type II errors might 
be unacceptable to policymakers given their preferences and (ii) the gain associated 
with receiving a signal from an indicator rather than ignoring it, which also depends 
on preferences, might be negligible. By contrast, Alessi and Detken’s (2011) loss 
function takes the policymaker’s relative risk aversion (T), between type I and type II 
errors, into account. The function is the preference-weighted sum of the two types of 
error. For instance, a T lower than 0.5 reveals that the policymaker is less averse to 
missing a signal for a costly financial crisis than to receiving a false alarm.  
 
The threshold for triggering the build-up and release of the CCB can be based on the 
policymakers’ assumed preferences. This requires two steps: (1) choosing the 
policymakers’ preference parameter T; and (2) calculating the threshold where the 
policymakers’ loss function is minimised over the desired horizon. Detken et al. 
(2014) argue that policymakers would be at least as concerned about missing a crisis 
as they would be about false alarms, with the preference parameter T thus in the 
interval of [0.5, 1]. A T smaller than 0.5 is a realistic description of policymakers’ loss 
of function, although the recent financial crisis might have increased the average T 
(Alessi and Detken, 2011). A policymaker would certainly have to cope with serious 
public pressure if being found to have spoiled the economic boom by relying on a 
false alarm. Furthermore, even if the indicator performed well and provided a correct 
signal and the policymaker successfully reduced excessive credit growth they might 
be criticised for too tight a monetary policy as the counterfactual reality is unavailable. 
The present study undertakes a more comprehensive analysis of policymakers’ risk 
aversion than Detken et al.’s (2014) by considering all possible T from 0 to 1.  
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Table 16 shows the build-up phase results of different policymakers’ preferences. The 
market illiquidity gap can satisfy the critical criteria for T at 0.5 and 0.6. The 
usefulness of market illiquidity at T = 0.5 and 0.6 is 0.20 and 0.10 respectively. This 
result implies that market illiquidity can only be used for those policymakers who 
value type I errors more than type II errors. On the other hand, the credit-to-GDP ratio 
gap cannot satisfy the critical criteria for any T. Table 17 shows the release phase 
results of different policymakers’ preferences. The optimal thresholds decrease when 
T increases. The usefulness of market illiquidity peaked at T = 0.5, which was 0.27. 
More importantly, market illiquidity can satisfy the critical criteria for T ranging from 
0.3 to 0.7. In other words, regardless of which type of error is more important to 
policymakers, the market illiquidity gap is always a reliable indicator for the CCB 
release phase. Practically, the market illiquidity gap can be used for different 
countries and for different types of policymakers as its performance is reliable for a 
wide range of preferences. By contrast, regardless of which policymakers’ preference 
is chosen, the credit-to-GDP ratio gap cannot satisfy the critical criteria. In summary, 
the market illiquidity gap is extremely useful for setting the CCB release phase, as the 
CCB is a rule-based macroprudential tool that operates on an international level. It is 
also useful for the CCB build-up phase although its performance is only reliable for 
T = 0.5 and 0.6. Conversely, the credit-to-GDP ratio is not a reliable indicator for 
either phase of the CCB.  
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Table 16. Policymaker’s choice – build-up 
The policymakers’ risk aversion (θ) to type I and type II errors of the market illiquidity gap (ILO) and credit-to-GDP ratio gap (C/GDP) ranging from 0 to 1. 
A θ less than 0.5 indicates that the policymakers are more averse to false alarms (type II error) than missing a crisis (type I error). A θ more than 0.5 indicates 
that the policymakers are more averse to missing a costly crisis (type 1 error) than getting a false alarm (type II error). A θ of 0.5 represents a balanced 
policymakers’ risk aversion to type I and II errors.  
T Optimal T TPR FPR Loss function Usefulness 
ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP 
0 –7.43 32.83 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.1 –6.56 32.83 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.00 
0.2 –5.25 32.83 0.32 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.18 0.20 0.03 0.00 
0.3 –5.22 32.83 0.33 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.24 0.30 0.06 0.00 
0.4 –4.73 5.70 0.44 0.27 0.11 0.13 0.29 0.37 0.11 0.03 
0.5 –3.16 –0.49 0.71 0.51 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.41 0.20 0.09 
0.6 –3.16 –8.02 0.71 0.82 0.32 0.67 0.30 0.37 0.10 0.03 
0.7 2.87 –41.73 0.97 1.00 0.79 1.00 0.26 0.30 0.04 0.00 
0.8 5.26 –41.73 0.99 1.00 0.85 1.00 0.18 0.20 0.02 0.00 
0.9 7.21 –41.73 0.99 1.00 0.87 1.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 
1 17.81 –41.73 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
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Table 17. Policymaker’s choice – release phase 
Policymakers’ risk aversion (θ) to type I and type II errors of the market illiquidity gap (ILO) and credit-to-GDP ratio gap (C/GDP) ranging from 0 to 1. A θ 
less than 0.5 indicates that the policymakers are more averse to false alarms (type II error) than missing a crisis (type I error). A θ more than 0.5 indicates that 
the policymakers are more averse to missing a costly crisis (type 1 error) than to getting a false alarm (type II error). A θ of 0.5 represents a balanced 
policymakers’ risk aversion to type I and II errors.  
 Optimal T TPR FPR Loss function Usefulness 
ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP ILO C/GDP 
0 79.58 –41.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.1 79.58 –41.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 
0.2 11.87 –41.73 0.32 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.17 0.20 0.03 0.00 
0.3 2.30 –41.73 0.66 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.21 0.30 0.09 0.00 
0.4 2.00 –41.73 0.73 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.22 0.40 0.18 0.00 
0.5 1.43 55.14 0.75 1.00 0.20 1.00 0.23 0.50 0.27 0.00 
0.6 –1.06 55.14 0.87 1.00 0.34 1.00 0.22 0.40 0.18 0.00 
0.7 –1.06 55.14 0.87 1.00 0.34 1.00 0.19 0.30 0.11 0.00 
0.8 –3.17 55.14 0.93 1.00 0.57 1.00 0.17 0.20 0.03 0.00 
0.9 –5.76 55.14 1.00 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.00 
1 –5.76 55.14 1.00 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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4.6 Chapter Conclusions 
  
The ability to identify and measure systemic risks and vulnerabilities is a key factor 
for successfully implementing macroprudential instruments, because imprecise timing 
of application of these instruments can result in the overshooting or undershooting of 
macroprudential objectives. Costs of a mistimed activation are asymmetric, as 
delayed action is generally more costly than premature intervention. During the build-
up phase of any vulnerability, delayed activation may imply that the CCB is less 
effective or even ineffective as there is insufficient time for them to gain traction. 
Alternatively, it may even initiate the disorderly unwinding of imbalances that have 
been built up. In both cases, crises may materialise. In contrast, implementing CCB 
too early is likely to incur unnecessary regulatory costs and may weaken the impact of 
the chosen instrument, as market participants will have more time to develop 
strategies to avoid and arbitrage them. During the release phase, on the other hand, 
deactivating CCB too early may give market participants an incorrect signal, while 
releasing them too late may amplify procyclical effects, as banks may have to 
deleverage more to satisfy additional macroprudential buffers.  
 
The design of the CCB addresses the timing issue by distinguishing between the 
indicators for the two phases. For the build-up phase, the preferred reference guide 
described in the BCBS documents is the credit-to-GDP ratio gap. For the release 
phase, there is no proven indicator to identify optimal timing. The present study 
addresses this lack of an indicator for the release phase. This chapter proposed stock 
market illiquidity, measured with Longstaff’s (1995) lookback option framework, as 
an early warning indicator for a financial crisis. It is an endogenous measure of 
maximum bid-ask spread of transaction cost for the market as a whole. The forecast 
performance of stock market illiquidity increases when two quarters ahead of a crisis 
and becomes even stronger when crisis nears. This implies that stock market 
illiquidity is a near-coincident early warning indicator, which is suitable for CCB 
release. Moreover, market illiquidity can satisfy the rule-based requirement for being 
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a CCB indicator, as it is reliable for policymakers with different risk aversion between 
type I and type II errors. In addition, market illiquidity is a useful indicator for the 
CCB build-up phase as its performance is better than the standard indicator, that is, 
the credit-to-GDP ratio.  
 
Compare to the early studies on market liquidity, this study highlights the importance 
of stock market illiquidity in CCB decisions. It demonstrates that the market 
illiquidity gap works better than the credit-to-GDP ratio in capturing the build-up of 
systemic risk ahead of banking crises, and in releasing timely and accurate signals 
when crises do occur. The findings in this chapter also contribute to the Early 
Warning Indicator on financial stability. Market illiquidity should play a more 
important role in the future of macroprudential tools to protect the stability of the 
financial sector and to prevent shocks to the financial system from being transmitted 
to the real economy. 
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Chapter 5 – Conclusions  
 
5.1 Summary of the Thesis   
 
The financial crisis that began in 2007 had its origins in deregulation, high levels of 
leverage ratio and international capital flows. The interaction between the three trends 
led to the build-up of systemic risk globally during the pre-GFC period. However, 
instead of reducing risk-taking, banking regulation requirements were dominated by 
microprudential approaches that could lead to excessive credit growth. From 1996, 
the Basel Committee modified the regulation rules further to allow banks to set their 
own capital requirements on the basis of their internal risk estimates. In practice, risk 
weightings came to be based on the ratings given to securities and structured financial 
products set by private rating agencies. This microprudential type of capital regulation 
requirement only considers idiosyncratic risks faced by individual banks. In other 
words, it is only designed to safeguard individual banks, but not the entire financial 
system. This internal risk management causes the well-known procyclicality of the 
financial system. As a result, banks’ balance sheets grew to new heights relative to 
their equity. Moreover, procyclicality leads to underestimation of systemic risk during 
economic upturns and overestimation of systemic risk during economic downturns. 
As a result, the capital buffer tends to reduce when systemic risk builds up and 
increase during financial crisis. Finally, the shortcomings of the microprudential 
capital requirement approach were highlighted by the GFC. Since the GFC, capital 
requirements with macroprudential perspective have been recommended to mitigate 
systemic risks and safeguard the financial system as a whole. 
 
The Basel III is a new capital requirement framework with macroprudential 
perspective. As an important component of the Basel III, the CCB is proposed to 
address the build-up of systemic risk associated with periods of excessive credit 
growth. Theoretically, the build-up of the CCB can lean against the build-up of 
systemic risk during economic upturns and provide extra capital for financial system 
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to absorb losses during economic downturns. In practice, indicators with 
macroprudential and early warning properties are required to guide the build-up phase 
of the CCB. Indicators with macroprudential and near-coincident properties are 
required for the release phase of the CCB. Although the Basel Committee proposed 
the credit-to-GDP ratio as a standard indicator to guide the buffer build-up phase, 
there is no standard indicator for the release phase. Moreover, the credit-to-GDP ratio 
has several shortcomings as a build-up phase indicator. For instance, the results from 
chapter 3 demonstrate that the credit-to-GDP ratio is negatively correlated with the 
business cycle indicator (that is, GDP growth). This implies that the credit-to-GDP 
ratio itself is procyclical. Therefore, to better achieve the purpose of the CCB, 
indicators for both build-up and release phases are required. Motivated by the 
shortcomings of the credit-to-GDP ratio in achieving the purposes of the CCB, this 
thesis proposed two alternative guiding indicators for the CCB – the distance-to-
default of the sovereign sector and stock market illiquidity.  
 
The two indicators provided by this thesis can detect two sources of systemic risk left 
out by the credit-to-GDP ratio: sovereign sector risk-taking behaviour and 
international capital flows. The sovereign sector was heavily involved in the GFC. 
For instance, the US Government supported the risk-taking of the ‘government-
sponsored entities’ Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac through legislation design. As 
sovereign debts (government bonds) are treated as risk-free assets in the market-based 
financial system, they increasingly play an important role in the system. It has been 
observed that financial institutions increase their demand for sovereign debts as they 
can use them as collateral to get short-term loans from the funding markets. In turn, 
the sovereign sector can borrow easily from the financial markets with low rates. 
 
This close association between the financial system and the sovereign sector was 
highlighted during the recent European debt crisis. Furthermore, international capital 
flows strengthen the relationship between these two sectors through the activities of 
the internationally operated banks and international funding markets. For instance, 
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emerging countries such as China are continually using their trading surplus to buy 
US Government or government agency debts, which leads to the yields on these 
securities being held artificially low. As US mortgage rates are closely linked to 
treasury yields, such international capital flows further inflate an already bubbling 
property market. As a result, the property market bubble in the US is far from a 
domestic bubble, now with multinational reach. Thus, there were two dimensions to 
the interactions that occurred during the pre-GFC period: the US financial system 
interacted with the international financial system, and the international trading system 
interacted with the international financial system.  
 
5.2 Significance of the Research 
 
To examine the systemic risks mentioned above, this thesis proposes two frameworks 
to assess the macroprudential Basel III CCB: the sovereign contingent claim analysis 
framework and the endogenous lookback option pricing framework. On one hand, 
distance-to-default is generated from a sovereign contingent claim analysis 
framework, which is able to measure the systemic risk of the sovereign sector. It is 
based on risk-adjusted balance sheets, which links the financial sector and sovereign 
sector together. Therefore, the framework combines both macroeconomy and 
financial system information. It provides a top-down approach to examine the 
interactions between the sovereign sector and the financial sector. In contrast, stock 
market illiquidity is generated from Longstaff’s (1995) lookback option framework, 
and measures the maximum endogenous price of the system-wide liquidity risk of the 
financial market. The measurement is able to capture endogenous liquidity risk inside 
and outside a given country. Therefore, market illiquidity is an ideal indicator to 
capture the contagion effect, and is thus suitable for signalling the CCB at an 
international level.   
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The empirical results from this thesis imply three common properties of these 
indicators. Firstly, they are both forward-looking indicators. Secondly, they both use a 
top-down approach rather than a bottom-up approach. Thirdly, they are both near-
coincident indicators. These three properties are important for setting decisions of the 
CCB. The top-down approach is in line with the macroprudential nature of the Basel 
III, which aims to protect the banking system as a whole. The forward-looking 
property is useful for the buffer build-up phase, as policymakers need sufficient time 
to build up a buffer before a crisis occurs. The near-coincident property is extremely 
suitable for the CCB release phase as the buffer needs a swift release when a crisis 
occurs. More importantly, both indicators are not only able to identify systemic risk 
within domestic banking sectors but also identify systemic risks at the international 
aggregate level.  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 compared the distance-to-default of the sovereign sector and the 
stock market illiquidity with the credit-to-GDP ratio separately by using the signal 
extraction method and ROC analysis. Although other empirical results support the use 
of credit-to-GDP as a standard indicator for guiding the CCB, this thesis shows that 
distance-to-default and stock market illiquidity are more suitable indicators for 
guiding the CCB. Glese et al. (2014) argue that it is important to augment the credit-
to-GDP gap with a range of complementary indicators. This is partly due to the fact 
that other indicators might provide additional information on the build-up of system-
wide vulnerabilities that the credit-to-GDP gap cannot detect. Different kinds of 
variables may be better suited to providing information for the decision on whether to 
reduce the CCB as the credit-to-GDP gap displays a poor signalling ability in this 
context (Drehmann et al., 2010, 2011). For the build-up phase, the results presented in 
this thesis highlight distance-to-default and stock market illiquidity as better 
indicators than credit-to-GDP. For the release phase, distance-to-default and stock 
market illiquidity exhibit outstanding performance. They both demonstrate near-
coincident properties that co-move with the financial crisis. Conversely, credit-to-
GDP is not a suitable indicator for the CCB release phase. Therefore, results from 
chapter 3 and 4 answer the research questions from chapter 1. Sovereign contingent 
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claim analysis and endogenous market illiquidity are suitable for assessing the 
countercyclical capital buffer in both build-up and release phase. Moreover, distance-
to-default and market illiquidity are better measures of systemic risk than the credit-
to-GDP ratio.  
 
This research contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, it provides 
frameworks to assess the CCB in a more comprehensive way, including sovereign 
sector risk-taking, international capital flows and contagion effects. Secondly, it 
applies the signal extraction method and ROC analysis to compare the performances 
of different indicators during the two phases of the CCB. The empirical results show 
that distance-to-default and market illiquidity perform better than the credit-to-GDP 
ratio during the build-up phase. More importantly, this research provides two reliable 
indicators to fill the gap of leading release phase indicators for the CCB. Thirdly, 
drawing from a larger data sample than Repullo and Saurina (2011), this research 
confirms the shortcomings of the credit-to-GDP ratio as a leading indicator of the 
CCB. Fourthly, this thesis incorporates policymakers’ risk aversion in the analysis. It 
confirms the reliability of using stock market illiquidity as an international-level 
release indicator.   
 
5.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies  
 
This thesis highlights the importance of sovereign contingent claims and market 
illiquidity in monitoring systemic risk in a market-based financial system. Measures 
of distress in the sovereign sector and of market-based liquidity should play a more 
important role in the future macroprudential Basel III framework to enhance the 
accuracy and reliability of financial system stability indicators. However, this thesis 
also has three major limitations. Firstly, the thesis sample does not cover emerging 
countries. The reliability of the distance-to-default of the sovereign sector and stock 
market illiquidity as a guiding indicator for the CCB could be questioned by emerging 
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countries’ regulators and policymakers. Secondly, from a technical perspective, the 
data frequency for generating the distance-to-default used in this study is low (yearly). 
A more frequent data set would improve the accuracy of evaluation signals, especially 
in the release phase as a financial crisis could unfold in a very short time. Thirdly, 
how to use distance-to-default of sovereign sector and stock market illiquidity to 
guide the CCB build-up and release is unclear. Given these limitations, there are three 
possible extensions for future studies:  
 
(1) Test the performance of distance-to-default and market illiquidity in emerging 
countries. This extension requires extra data collection as data periods for emerging 
countries are often short. For instance, the transparency of government debt data can 
be a problem. In addition, the history of the stock market for some emerging countries 
can be quite short.  
 
(2) Use higher frequency government debt data and market-based asset information 
to test the performance of systemic risk related methods of the sovereign sectors and 
the aggregate market. This extension requires higher frequent government debt data 
for both advanced and emerging countries. The use of more frequent data could 
provide more accurate tools for regulators and policymakers to monitor dynamic 
systemic risks.  
 
(3) Set up rule-based thresholds for using distance-to-default of sovereign sector and 
stock market illiquidity as CCB guiding indicators. The purpose of this extension is to 
explore the standard thresholds for distance-to-default and market illiquidity to guide 
CCB build-up and release. This extension is closely related to the other two 
extensions. A clear rule-based standard is required for distance-to-default and market 
illiquidity to play an important role in future macroprudential Basel III capital 
requirements.  
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(4) Combine the distance-to-default of the sovereign sector and the market illiquidity 
measure to improve the accuracy and stability of the signals in both CCB phases. As 
it is hard for one indicator to cover all possible systemic risks, this extension could 
provide a set of indicators that covers as many systemic risks as possible.  
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Annex 1- Sample Data (Chapter 3) 
 
Country Period Crises year 
Austria 1980-2011 2008 
Belgium 1980-2011 2008 
Bulgaria 2001-2011  
Czech Republic 1994-2011  
Croatia 1993-2011  
Cyprus 1998-2011  
Denmark 1980-2011 2008 
Estonia 1995-2000  
Finland 1980-2011 1991 
France 1975-2011 2008 
Germany 1976-2011 2008 
Greece 1991-2011 2008 
Hungary 1992-2011 2008 
Ireland 1977-2011 2008 
Italy 1980-2011 2008 
Lithuania 1996-2011  
Luxembourg 1996-2011 2008 
Malta 1996-2011  
Netherland 1982-2011 2008 
Norway 1980-2011 1991 
Poland 1997-2011  
Portugal 1996-2011 2008 
Romania 1999-2011  
Slovak 1997-2011  
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Slovenia 1998-2011 2008 
Switzerland 1986-2011 2008 
Spain 1980-2011 2008 
Sweden 1980-2011 1991, 2008 
UK 1980-2011 2007 
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Annex 2 – Figure 2. Time-series changes of distance-to-default gap and credit-to-GDP ratio gap in percentage 
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Annex 3 – Figure 3. The behavior of market illiquidity and credit-to-GDP ratio gaps around the financial crisis period. 
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